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We analyze the interaction of firm product quality and pricing decisions with financial distress and
bankruptcy in the airline industry. We consider an airline's choices of quality and price as dynamic
decisions that trade off current cash flows for future revenue. We examine how airline mishandled
baggage, on-time performance and pricing are related to financial distress and bankruptcy, controlling
for the endogeneity of financial distress and bankruptcy. We find that an airline's quality decisions
are differentially affected by financial distress and bankruptcy. Product quality decreases when airlines
are in financial distress, consistent with financial distress reducing a firm's incentive to invest in quality.
In contrast, in bankruptcy product quality increases relative to financial distress. In addition, we find
that firms price more aggressively when in financial distress consistent with firms trying to increase
short-term market share and revenues.
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Financial distress is frequently cited as inﬂuencing ﬁrm value by causing ﬁrms to take actions that
would be suboptimal in normal times in order to reduce their chance of entering bankruptcy and
potentially being liquidated.1 Potential costs of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy are commonly
given as a reason for ﬁrms to have less debt than they would have otherwise chosen given the
potential tax advantages of debt. The potential costs of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy include
the possibility that customers and suppliers may not wish to do business with a ﬁrm that is likely to
fail as they may lose value if the ﬁrm is liquidated (Titman 1984). Additionally, in ﬁnancial distress,
the ﬁrm may produce a lower quality product and attempt to sell this product as higher quality
in order to stave oﬀ bankruptcy as modeled by Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Empirically, the
importance of these eﬀects is unknown.
We examine how product quality and pricing decisions vary with ﬁnancial distress and bank-
ruptcy in the airline industry. We analyze whether managers reduce product market quality and
prices in periods of ﬁnancial distress before the ﬁrm actually defaults, as well as quality and pricing
decisions in bankruptcy. Our measure of ﬁnancial distress is a ﬁrm’s probability of default, calcu-
lated using Merton’s distance to default measure. Changes in the probability of default may reduce
a ﬁrm’s incentives to produce a high quality product since a reduction in quality may increase cur-
rent cash ﬂows at the expense of bondholders who may receive less in the future. Similarly, the ﬁrm
may also have incentives to lower prices to increase market share and current cash ﬂow even if this
triggers a price war in the future. Bankruptcy, however, can have a diﬀerent eﬀect. In bankruptcy,
t h et i m eh o r i z o no fﬁrm managers may be longer, as debtholders and other ﬁxed claimants are
closer to becoming future owners of the ﬁrm and management may also wish to be involved in the
ﬁrm post-bankruptcy.2 In addition, ﬁrm claimants’ incentives to invest in customer retention may
increase under bankruptcy, as they need to demonstrate to the bankruptcy judge that the ﬁrm is
1See for example, the Wall Street Journal, Dec 17, 2008, p B1. Also see Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994)
for ﬁrm-speciﬁc actions taken by a sample of junk-bond issuers to avoid bankruptcy.
2Hotchkiss (1995) examines ﬁrms post-bankruptcy and ﬁnds that the management of many bankrupt ﬁrms does
not change after emerging from Chapter 11 and ﬁnds evidence of ineﬃcient continuation of ﬁrms post-bankruptcy.
Strömberg (2000) documents that conﬂicts of interest in bankruptcy auctions can lead to ineﬃcient continuation
decisions.
1viable as a going concern. Thus the ﬁrm managers and claimants to the ﬁrm may have incentives
to increase quality in bankruptcy relative to periods of ﬁnancial distress to keep existing customers.
We examine how two diﬀerent components of product quality in the airline industry, mishandled
baggage and on-time performance, and airline pricing, are related to ﬁnancial distress and bank-
ruptcy. Econometrically, we estimate a simultaneous system of equations for price, quantity and
quality, along with ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy.
We ﬁnd that airlines’ quality and pricing decisions are aﬀected by ﬁnancial distress and bank-
ruptcy. Financial distress reduces a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in quality. In addition, ﬁrms price
more aggressively when in ﬁnancial distress, consistent with them trying to increase short-term
market share and revenues. Interestingly, the negative eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress on product qual-
ity are not present during bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, product quality increases relative to the
pre-bankruptcy ﬁnancial distress period, consistent with airlines investing in customer retention
and reputation through product quality. Regarding prices, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms further reduce prices
in bankruptcy relative to periods of ﬁnancial distress. These results are robust to using route-
level analysis with ﬁrm-route ﬁxed eﬀects for the only quality measure available at that level of
aggregation (on-time performance).
We add to the previous literature on bankruptcy and ﬁnancial distress by focusing on identifying
real eﬀects on quality. Hoshi, Kashap, and Scharfstein (1990), Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein
(1994), Sharpe (1994) and Hotchkiss (1995) ﬁnd that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms have a greater
tendency to cut investment, sell assets, and reduce employment than their non-leveraged coun-
terparts. Campello (2003) shows that sales growth of leveraged high debt ﬁrms drops more in
recessions. However, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Khanna and Poulsen (1995) ﬁnd no diﬀer-
ences in actions by ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms versus benchmarked competitors. Maksimovic and
Phillips (1998) ﬁnd that industry conditions are a primary determinant of bankruptcy outcomes
and that ﬁr m sm a k ee ﬃcient liquidation decisions. Khanna and Tice (2005) show that high debt
ﬁrms are more likely to exit low price cities and are more likely to be eﬃcient. Benmelech and
Bergman (2010) examine the eﬀect of bankruptcy on competitors through the decreased value of
collateralizable assets in the industry.
Previous research on ﬁnancial distress in airlines by Pulvino (1998) has documented that asset
sales by distressed airline ﬁrms are associated with a signiﬁcant price discount. Additional articles
2have examined the eﬀect of ﬁnancial conditions on airline accident rates. Rose (1990) examines
a i r l i n ea c c i d e n t sa n dﬁnds that accident rates decrease with an airline’s operating margin — a
measure of ﬁnancial health of an airline. Dionne et al. (1997) criticizes Rose’s approach arguing
that operating margin is not the right measure of ﬁnancial health because underinvestment in airline
safety can increase operating margin in absence of accidents. They propose leverage as a measure
of ﬁnancial condition and obtain mixed results for the eﬀect of ﬁnancial condition on airline safety.
Noronha and Singal (2004) use bond ratings to capture the ﬁnancial health of an airline and ﬁnd
that better bond ratings are related to lower accident rates. However, they only examine cross-
sectional variation between ﬁrms. It is likely that better-run airlines could have caused both lower
accident rates and higher bond ratings creating an omitted variable bias.
Several papers examine pricing decisions in the airline industry. Busse (2002) examines how
ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms price in the airline industry and ﬁnds prices are cut when leverage is high
or interest coverage is low. Borenstein and Rose (1995) show that prices decline pre-bankruptcy but
then remain constant in bankruptcy. They conclude that ﬁrms change their prices due to ﬁnancial
distress and not due to bankruptcy because consumers believe that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms oﬀer
lower quality, which in turn lowers demand and optimally lowers ﬁrm price. While this is a possible
interpretation there is no evidence in that paper that ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms actually oﬀer lower
quality or that the reduction in price is due to a reduction in demand. Our article documents the
direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial conditions on product quality showing that there is an additional cost of
ﬁnancial distress in the form of reduced quality of service for the airline’s customers and examines
the diﬀerences between the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy.
Lastly, a series of papers examines bankruptcy and not ﬁnancial distress. Borenstein and Rose
(2003) examine the eﬀect of the share of airport capacity operated by airlines in bankruptcy on the
number of ﬂights and destinations from a given airport. They ﬁnd that the number of ﬂights from a
given airport decreases for bankrupt airlines. However it is hard to interpret this ﬁnding given that
bankruptcy is an endogenous outcome. Two recent papers by Ciliberto and Schenone (2010a, 2010b)
focus just on bankruptcy and examine the impact of bankruptcy on airline pricing, product variety
and on-time performance. They do not examine ﬁnancial distress as they exclude two quarters
of data prior to the ﬁrm declaring bankruptcy and they also do not compute any probability of
bankruptcy for non-bankrupt periods and non-bankrupt airlines. They thus compare bankruptcy
to non-distress periods for airlines that declare bankruptcy and do not control for the endogeneity of
3bankruptcy.3 Lastly Benmelech and Bergman (2010) examine how bankruptcy of one ﬁrm imposes
negative externalities on non-bankrupt industry competitors by driving down the collateral value of
assets used in the industry. They show that the cost of debt ﬁnancing increases for industry ﬁrms.
Our ﬁnding that prices fall with measures of default probability also indicates that default
is involuntary in our setting and that ﬁrms adopt strategies that may allow them to recover. In
contrast, previous work on voluntary increases in ﬁnancial leverage by Chevalier (1995) and Phillips
(1995) shows that prices increase with voluntary leverage buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts
(MBOs) in most industries. Phillips (1995) does show that in the gypsum industry there were
price cuts following the large increases in leverage. However, in this industry there was entry
by a Canadian ﬁrm and gypsum ﬁrms that undertook leveraged buyouts ended up in involuntary
ﬁnancial distress followed by bankruptcy.
Our paper contributes on multiple dimensions to our understanding of how ﬁnancial distress
and bankruptcy aﬀect ﬁrm quality and pricing decisions. First, our paper examines the eﬀect
of both ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy on product quality and pricing. We show that ﬁrms’
quality decisions are substantially diﬀerent in ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy versus non-bankrupt
periods. Our paper is the ﬁrst to show econometrically that ﬁrms reduce quality when faced with
ﬁnancial distress in order to increase their probability of near term survival. In contrast to ﬁnancial
distress, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms increase quality in bankruptcy relative to periods of ﬁnancial distress.
Second, we simultaneously estimate equations for the ﬁrm’s pricing, quantity, quality decisions and
its ﬁnancial condition, explicitly controlling for the endogeneity of ﬁnancial condition using the
tangibility of the ﬁrm’s assets as instrument. Without controlling for the endogeneity of ﬁnancial
conditions, the estimated eﬀects of ﬁnancial condition on quality and prices might be biased, because
lower ﬁrm quality or prices may be the cause of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy in the ﬁrst place.
Lastly, we have a more precise measure of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial distress than the previous literature as
we use Merton’s probability of default, which is a continuous and more accurate measure of ﬁnancial
distress.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we give the theoretical background and also present
our econometric model. In Section 3, we describe our data. Section 4 presents the results for
ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy. Section 5 concludes.
3Financial distress might start earlier than just 2 periods before bankruptcy. In that scenario, they compare
distressed and not distressed periods with bankruptcy.
42 Quality and pricing in ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy
In this section we describe how ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s quality and
pricing decisions. In section 2.1 we describe the theoretical background and also describe the
implications we test from the prior theoretical literature. In section 2.2 we present the econometric
model we estimate.
2.1 Theoretical background
We draw on the theoretical article by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) in formulating the hypotheses
we test. Consider a ﬁrm with some degree of market power, to the extent it can choose price and
quality. Assume also that the good sold by the ﬁrm is an experience good so the quality is not
known beforehand. In periods of ﬁnancial distress, ﬁrm managers and equity holders may have
incentives to lower the quality of the product they sell if they can earn higher proﬁts until the lower
quality is observed. Firms can cut quality and given that quality provision is costly, this will lower
the marginal cost of production. Until consumers realize the good sold is of lower quality, ﬁrms
will earn higher proﬁts. Once the lower quality is observed, ﬁrms will face reduced demand. If
the claimants do not bear the full cost of this reduced demand or face a very high discount rate,
they may have incentives to shift proﬁts into nearby periods. These features ﬁt well the airline
industry. In the airline industry, ﬁrm’s provision of quality is to some extent unobserved at the
time an airline ticket is sold. Consumers can observe lagged measures of quality, but quality at the
actual time the ﬂight is taken may be quite diﬀe r e n tt h a np a s tq u a l i t y . F i r m sm a ya l s of a c eav e r y
high demand for current proﬁts and may be willing to trade future proﬁts for current proﬁts.
Debt, ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy play a role just as in the Maksimovic and Titman model,
as ﬁnancial distress and expected bankruptcy can increase the incentives of ﬁrms to lower quality.
The intuition for ﬁnancial distress to play a role is simple and follows directly from their model.
If the ﬁrm defaults on its debt, debtholders rather than equityholders bear the loss of the future
market share. If a ﬁrm faces a signiﬁcant chance of defaulting on its debt, it may choose to cut
quality today in order to survive in the hopes that there is a positive demand shock before consumers
discover the lower quality. The positive demand shock may enable survival, despite the demand
reduction that comes as a consequence of lower past quality. Afterwards, the ﬁrm can rebuild its
reputation.
5Put diﬀerently, the probability of default enters in the airline’s supply of quality decision. The
ﬁrm’s supply of quality will be aﬀected by a higher probability of default because the future beneﬁts
of quality diminish, given that there is a higher probability that the ﬁrm will enter into bankruptcy
(equivalent to a higher discount rate). To the extent that not all consumers are aware of this present
cut in quality, the ﬁrm optimally reduces quality taking an involuntary loan from consumers. This
might help the ﬁrm, in the short run, to avoid bankruptcy.
Airline pricing can also be aﬀected by ﬁnancial distress. Morrison and Winston (1996) and Busse
(2002) have found evidence that the prices in the airline industry are characterized by alternating
periods of tacit collusive agreements and price wars. Price wars can be triggered as a ﬁrm reduces
prices and deviates from the tacit collusive agreement prices in order to gain market share in the
short run. As a higher default probability is equivalent to a higher discount rate a ﬁrm in ﬁnancial
distress will be more prone to reduce prices even if this triggers a price war in the future, given
that bondholders might be the ones who receive less in the future if this happens. This logic holds
only if there is no immediate detection of the price deviation. While the reduction in prices can
be observed, airlines can modify the average price of their tickets by changing the composition of
seats sold without changing their posted prices and this action may go unnoticed by other airlines
for a signiﬁcant period, giving scope for a non immediate detection from competitors.4 This logic
diﬀers from Borenstein and Rose (1995) interpretation of pre-bankruptcy price reduction. They
argue that prices go down because demand is lower for a distressed ﬁr m . O u rh y p o t h e s i si st h a t
even after controlling for demand changes there is still an incentive to reduce prices as a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial distress increases.
We thus test the following central implication:
Hypothesis 1: Firms cut product quality and price as the probability of default increases.
Our main focus is on ﬁnancial distress but we extend our analysis to Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
We also consider the eﬀect of operating in Chapter 11 bankruptcy on ﬁrms’ decisions. Chapter 11
bankruptcy is a state in which the ﬁrm continues to operate while it is attempting to reorganize.
4It is well known that airlines charge diﬀerent prices even within economy class. Each airline decides how many
seats to oﬀer at each price using an optimization package (e.g: PROS). The cheapest seats are sold ﬁrst and as time
passes the more expensive ones start to sell as well. If an airline decides to sell all the economy seats at the cheapest
price the average price of that airline will be reduced, yet the posted price might not have changed. This makes the
detection of price deviations diﬃcult because other ﬁrms will ﬁnd out only after observing that their bookings are
not behaving as expected.
6There are several key provisions of Chapter 11 bankruptcy that are relevant to our analysis: the
automatic stay provision, the voting procedure in Chapter 11, the feasibility test, and debtor-in-
possession ﬁnancing. These provisions are described fully in Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), who
theoretically show how they aﬀect ﬁrm investment and emergence from Chapter 11.
During Chapter 11, under the automatic stay provision payments to creditors are deferred while
the ﬁrm reorganizes.5 Firm management has the right to propose a reorganization plan to emerge
from Chapter 11 to the bankruptcy judge. The plan is then voted upon by claimants to the ﬁrm,
with each class approving the plan if one-half by number and two thirds of the aggregate face
value agree to the plan. The plan involves oﬀering new securities to existing claimants under which
they exchange their old debt securities for less senior and covenant free securities like equity. This
exchange oﬀer is also called the exit consent provision. Management’s right to propose a plan legally
exists for the ﬁrst hundred and twenty days, but extensions are generally automatically granted by
the bankruptcy judge. In addition the bankruptcy judge can approve additional debt securities,
called debtor in possession ﬁnancing, that are senior to existing debt issued before Chapter 11. The
additional debt securities allow the ﬁrm to have funds to invest and continue to operate, reducing
the debt overhang problem.
This bankruptcy reorganization plan also has to pass a feasibility test — speciﬁcally management
has to demonstrate to the judge that the ﬁrm is viable as a going concern under the new plan. This
plan can include a request to the bankruptcy judge that past union contracts be changed and a new
wage structure imposed on the ﬁrm’s employees. In addition, the ﬁrm can ask the bankruptcy judge
to turn over past union pensions to the government pension fund, the Pension BeneﬁtG u a r a n t e e
Corporation (PBGC). The value of the pension paid by the PBGC is typically much lower than
previous commitments under past labor agreements.
We hypothesize that Chapter 11 bankruptcy aﬀects the incentives of managers diﬀerently than
the probability of distress. Given that management wishes to emerge from bankruptcy, it has a much
longer term perspective than during ﬁnancial distress. We hypothesize that it now has incentives
to treat existing customers well and to increase quality and thus invest in its long run reputation.
The eﬀect on price is less clear. There are three conﬂicting incentives. Two of them imply that
prices do not increase with respect to the distress period and one of them implies that they increase.
First, the management does not have to make interest and principal payments and as such has more
5Aircraft ﬁnancing is exempt from automatic stay provision (section 1110 of chapter 11 bankruptcy).
7ﬂexibility to reduce price6. Second, airlines need to convince consumers to ﬂyw i t ht h e mi ns p i t eo f
potential recent quality cuts and the consumer’s potential belief that the ﬁrm may be liquidated.
Therefore, prices should not increase. However, an airline also has to demonstrate feasibility to the
bankruptcy judge and thus, controlling for demand, it must demonstrate that it can make proﬁts
on a per customer basis, which may give an incentive to raise prices. Given the ambiguity in the
eﬀect of bankruptcy on prices, we are only able to state our second central hypothesis in terms of
product quality:
Hypothesis 2: In bankruptcy, ﬁrms increase product quality relative to pre-bankruptcy ﬁnan-
cial distress periods.
2.2 Empirical strategy and econometric model
Our empirical strategy analyzes the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress, measured as default probability,
a n db a n k r u p t c yo naﬁrm’s supply decisions (product-quality and price). We analyze ﬁnancial
distress separately from bankruptcy as a ﬁrm’s default probability is not deﬁned when a ﬁrm is
in bankruptcy. Our measure of default probability is based on stock prices and when ﬁrms go
into bankruptcy, speciﬁcally Chapter 11, are not traded in the market, so there is no information
about their stock price. Following the analysis of the impact of ﬁnancial distress on a ﬁrm’s supply
decision we analyze the diﬀerential eﬀect of bankruptcy relative to periods of high ﬁnancial distress.
Analyzing the periods of ﬁnancial distress is the primary focus of our paper. Analyzing ﬁnancial
distress separately from bankruptcy has the advantage of not imposing any value on the default
probability when it is not deﬁned (during bankruptcy). This is important since we hypothesize
that before bankruptcy the default probability plays the role of a higher discount rate, shortening
the ﬁrm’s horizon; but while in bankruptcy a higher ﬁnancial distress does not have any direct
implication regarding a ﬁrm’s horizon. Initially, we thus analyze distress excluding bankruptcy
periods and then separately analyze bankruptcy compared to pre-bankruptcy ﬁnancial distress
periods. The cost of analyzing distress separately from bankruptcy is that we do not use the whole
sample in both estimations. Thus initially, we use only non-bankruptcy ﬁrm-quarter observations
in analyzing the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress and we use only distressed and bankrupt ﬁrm-quarters
to analyze the diﬀerential eﬀects of bankruptcy and ﬁnancial distress.
6Additionally, airlines can renegotiate pension beneﬁts, reducing their costs (section 1113, chapter 11).
8Following our analysis of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy separately, we use the whole sample
to estimate simultaneously a system that contains both ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy. We end
up ﬁnding similar results using this approach as when we estimate ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy
in separate estimations. Thus in the interest of space, this method and the associated results are
presented in the appendix. The beneﬁt of this approach is that we can analyze the eﬀects of default
probability and bankruptcy on the ﬁrm’s supply decisions at the same time. However, there are
some limitations to this combined analysis. The main limitation is that we cannot estimate the
probability of ﬁnancial distress when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy. Thus in this case, we set the
ﬁnancial distress variable to be undeﬁned with a value of zero when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy and
let a "predicted" bankruptcy dummy pick up the full eﬀect of distress and bankruptcy. Note that
we are not explicitly saying the ﬁrm is not distressed when in bankruptcy, but econometrically we
are letting the bankruptcy variable to pick up the diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial distress that a ﬁrm
might face when the ﬁrm is actually in bankruptcy.7
We now present the econometric approach that we use to analyze ﬁnancial distress and bank-
ruptcy. We ﬁrst present the econometric model we use to analyze ﬁnancial distress and then follow
with the model for bankruptcy.
2.2.1 Financial distress
In this analysis of ﬁnancial distress, we initially drop ﬁrm-quarter observations where the ﬁrm
is in bankruptcy as ﬁnancial distress is not deﬁned in bankruptcy. We use a simultaneous equation
approach to estimate the impact of the probability of default on supply decisions. Speciﬁcally, we
jointly examine a ﬁrm’s supply decisions of quality (S) and price (P) with its quantity demanded
(Q) and the probability of default (Pr_def).
The following 4 simultaneous equations describe the airline economic environment:
1a. S=h(P,Q ,P r _ d e f ,Y )
2a. P=g(S,Q ,P r _ d e f ,X )
3a. Q=f(Pr_def,P ,S  ,W)
4a. Pr_def=j(Q,P ,S  Z)
7With this approach we can think of the ﬁrm as operating under 3 diﬀerent regimes: non-distressed and not
bankrupt; distressed but not bankrupt, and bankrupt.
9In the above equations, S are the two measures of quality, either the mishandled bags rate or on time
departures, P is our measure of price which following the airline industry convention is calculated
as a yield or average price per mile, Q is the total quantity of total enplaned passengers (TEP), and
Pr_def is the default probability. Equations (1a) and (2a) can be obtained from the optimization
problem of a ﬁrm that maximizes proﬁts, Π(P(.),S(.),Q(.),Pr_def(.)), with respect to S and P.
Equations (3a) and (4a) are the demand and default probability equations. Both of them can be
aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s pricing and quality decisions.
In order to choose the simplest setting to generate these ﬁrst order conditions, we assume linear
demand and assume that the marginal cost of transporting a passenger and the marginal cost
of providing quality are independent. In this simpler setting, which we adopt for the remaining
equations we present, the marginal eﬀect of quality on price and vice-versa are independent and
we can drop P from equation (1a) and S from equation (2a). However, the results we obtain are
invariant to their inclusion.
Y, X, W and Z are exogenous variables that aﬀect quality, price, quantity and default proba-
bility, respectively. Variables in Y that aﬀect the supply of quality are airport decongestion. The
variables in X that aﬀect pricing are oil fuel cost, average miles per ﬂight, oil eﬃciency and airport
decongestion. The variables in W that aﬀect quantity demand are competition, income, unemploy-
ment and airport decongestion and the variable in Z is the percentage of liquidable assets. We will
discuss these variables in the data section.
Equations (1a)-(4a) imply that the quantity demanded, Q, aﬀects the pricing strategy, as usual,
but might also aﬀect the quality supply decision because when there are high numbers of passengers
providing higher quality might be more costly. Additionally, Q aﬀects the default probability,
because lower demand presumably increases the default probability. Given that pricing and quality
decisions might aﬀect the default probability they are included in equation (4a) as well. Finally,
Qi sa ﬀected by the default probability because consumers might anticipate the incentives of the
airlines to under-provide quality while in ﬁnancial distress.
We take into account the endogeneity of price (P), quantity (Q), quality (S), and Pr_def using a
simultaneous instrumental variable (IV) approach. Our instruments for price (P) are the elements
of X that are excluded from the other 3 equations. Similarly, the instruments of quality (S), quantity
(Q) and Pr_def are the excluded components of Y, W and Z. We instrument Price or yield (P) with
10average miles per ﬂight, oil fuel cost and oil eﬃciency; we instrument total enplaned passengers (Q)
with local income, competition and local unemployment and we instrument the default probability
with the percentage of liquidable assets. We discuss these instruments and our identiﬁcation strategy
further below in Section 3.5. For now, we just limit ourselves to give a brief intuition of why they
satisfy the exclusion restriction. Oil prices, local area income and unemployment are exogenous to
ﬁrm’s decisions. The percentage of liquidable assets is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction as it
is unlikely that having more valuable assets in case of liquidation will aﬀect directly the quality of
a ﬁrm’s product or its prices. What can be argued is that this measure of tangibility has a relation
with performance, because better performance can lead a ﬁrm to acquire more ﬁxed assets, which
increase the percentage of liquidable assets. In that case, our instrument could directly aﬀect the
ﬁrms’ real outcomes, because it might be capturing unmeasured productivity to the extent that our
controls are not perfect. Nevertheless, this is unlikely, because we observe that higher percentage
of liquidable assets is positively related with high ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, states in which
productivity is unlikely to be high.
We do not have any variable that belongs to the set Y and is excluded from the other three
equations. As a consequence, we are unable to instrument S directly, thus we replace quality in
equations (3a) and (4a), and estimate:
1a’. S=h(Q,P r _ d e f ,Y )
2a’. P=g(Q,P r _ d e f ,X )
3a’. Q=f(Pr_def,P ,Y  ,W)
4a’. Pr_def=j(Q,P ,Y  Z)
We estimate this system using 3 stage least squares (3SLS) to take advantage of the potential error
correlation structure between the equations. In this speciﬁcation, we are able to analyze the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial distress on the price and quality supply decisions. We also use ﬁrm and time ﬁxed
eﬀects.
2.2.2 Bankruptcy
After considering the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress, we examine the impact of bankruptcy. We
hypothesize that Chapter 11 bankruptcy may aﬀect a ﬁrm’s quality positively relative to ﬁnancial
11distress given that a ﬁrm wishes to keep customers as it attempts to emerge from bankruptcy. We
do not have a clear prediction for prices. The ﬁrm has more ﬂexibility to lower prices in bankruptcy
as it does not has to pay principal and interests on its debt; it also may want to lower prices to
attract reluctant customers that may have observed lower quality during the period of ﬁnancial
distress; but the ﬁrm also may want to raise prices relative to those in ﬁnancial distress to raise
cash to demonstrate to the bankruptcy judge that it can successfully emerge from bankruptcy.
In our analysis of bankruptcy, we examine all ﬁrm-quarters in bankruptcy and compare them to
observations in which ﬁrms are in high ﬁnancial distress but is not in bankruptcy. We thus drop
ﬁrm-quarters where the ﬁrms have low probability of default. This sample does include ﬁrms that
have a high probability of default that do not enter bankruptcy. Econometrically, we estimate a
similar set of equations as for the ﬁnancial distress case, but examining the impact of bankruptcy
(a dummy variable) instead of default probability:
5a’. S=h(Q,B a n k r u p t ,Y )
6a’. P=g(Q,B a n k r u p t ,X )
7a’. Q=f(Bankrupt,P ,Y ,W )
8a’. Bankrupt=j(Q,P,Y,Z)
3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Airline data
Our data consists of an unbalanced quarterly panel of 21 airlines from the ﬁrst quarter of 1997
to the fourth quarter of 2008. The data was constructed using information from Transtats,as i t e
managed by the Bureau of Transportation Services (BTS); Air Travel Consumer Reports (ATCR)
also from the BTS; Compustat; the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP); and the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA).
Our ﬁnal sample is limited to ﬁrms included in all data sets. Airlines must have annual operating
revenues of at least US$20 million to be included in Transtats; they have to have a domestic revenue
market share greater than 1% to appear in ATCR and they must be publicly traded to have
12their ﬁnancial information included in Compustat and CRSP. Given that we have an unbalanced
panel with some ﬁrms entering and exiting the panel, our ﬁnal sample contains 647 ﬁrm-quarter
observations for the 21 airlines in our sample.8 T a b l e1s u m m a r i z e st h en a m e so ft h ec a r r i e r s ,t h e
number of quarters they appear in the sample and whether each of these carriers had a bankruptcy
episode during those quarters. Of the 21 carriers, 13 never entered into bankruptcy in our sample,
7 had one bankruptcy episode and only 1 ﬁrm, US Airways, had two bankruptcy episodes.
Insert Table 1 here
From Transtats we obtain each airline’s domestic operating passenger revenue (DOPR), domestic
passenger revenue miles (DPRM) and domestic total enplaned passengers (TEP) by segment.9 TEP
represents our measure of quantity, measured in millions of passengers; dividing DORP by DRPM
we obtain the “yield”, which is our measure of price. Yield is a common price indicator in the airline
industry, measuring the average price per mile a passenger is paying. Yield is measured in $US
cents following common industry practice. Prices are measured at the time tickets are purchased,
not when they are used.
We study two measures of quality: on time performance from Transtats and mishandled bags
per 1,000 customers from ATCR. We do not consider accidents as these are rare events and because
Rhoades and Waguespack (2000) ﬁnd safety and service quality to be highly correlated. We also
considered including the number of customer complaints but the Department of Transportation
(DOT) reports that it has not determined the validity of the complaints - thus our measures are
more objective.10 The BTS classiﬁes a ﬂight as late if it is 15 or more minutes late from the
scheduled arrival time. Nevertheless, constructing a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the
ﬂight is late and zero otherwise may hide information on how late are ﬂights.11
8Our unit of analysis is ﬁrm-quarters as there is no information at the route level for mishandled baggage.
9We measure TEP on a segment basis; measuring TEP on a leg basis leads to similar results. The diﬀerence
between legs and segments is best understood by an example. Suppose an airlline ﬂies from A to B, and from B to
C. A passenger ﬂying from A to B or B to C would be counted as one segment and one leg. A passenger ﬂying from
A to C, with a setpover in B, would be counted as one passenger in terms of segments, but two passengers in terms
of legs.
10We do not consider other measures of service quality, such as the ﬂight cancellation rate, not because we think
they are not important, but because they do not satisfy the Maksimovic and Titman (1991) framework in which
quality cuts increase short term proﬁts. There is no short-term beneﬁt of cancelling a ﬂight since passengers have to
b er e l o c a t e di no t h e rﬂights in the short run. The determinants of ﬂight cancellation can be better explained at the
route level (See Rupp and Holmes, 2003).
11Airlines sometimes are able to manipulate arrival times for ﬂights that are on the border of being on time. Our
measure does not suﬀer as signiﬁcantly from this potential manipulation.
13Our variable “Late” is constructed as the average delay of late ﬂights times the percentage of
late ﬂights. For instance, if a ﬁrm in a quarter has 20% of its ﬂights arriving late and their late
ﬂights are on average 50 minutes late, the variable “Late” takes a value of 50*0.2=10. To get higher
quality as an increasing function, we deﬁne "On Time Performance" as the inverse of Late.
From ATCR we obtain the mishandled baggage rate per 1,000 passengers. According to the
DOT, the deﬁnition of mishandled baggage is “lost, damaged, delayed or pilfered baggage”. Note
that airlines, and not airports, control important aspects of baggage handling given that airlines
have to relabel baggage when there is a change in schedule. Also airlines can decide whether to
invest in a better monitoring technology in terms of bar-coding and decide how many personnel to
assign to the monitoring of bags. Again, to get higher quality as an increasing function, we deﬁne
our variable as the inverse of the mishandled baggage rate, so the higher this rate is, less baggage is
lost. Our sample starts in the ﬁrst quarter on 1997 because there is no previous information about
mishandled baggage.
Figures 1A through 1C present some initial summary statistics for ﬁrms in the quarters preceding
and following bankruptcy. Figure 1A presents on-time performance, Figure 1B presents the inverse
of mishandled bags and Figure 1C presents airline pricing or yield. All data is quarterly, with
quarter zero representing the ﬁrst quarter a ﬁrm is in bankruptcy.
Insert Figure 1 here
The ﬁgures show that quality and price measures decrease in the quarters prior to bankruptcy.
Additionally, ﬁgures 1A and 1B show that quality increases after bankruptcy is declared.
Table 2 presents similar summary statistics. However, in this table we report detrended data,
where we detrend the quality and price variables by regressing the raw measures on time dummies
and ﬁrm dummies. Thus we use the residuals of these equations to construct Table 2. This table
includes data only for ﬁr m st h a tg oi n t ob a n k r u p t c ya ts o m ep o i n ti nt h es a m p l ea n ds p l i t st h e
data into observations more than four quarters befo r eb a n k r u p t c y ,t h ef o u rq u a r t e r sr i g h tb e f o r e
bankruptcy and the period the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy itself. The omitted default category is post-
bankruptcy.
Insert Table 2 here
14Table 2 shows several striking patterns. First, both measures of quality decrease sharply in the
four quarters prior to bankruptcy - a period of time we label as the "distress" period. Yield (our
measure of price) also decreases sharply during the distress period. The diﬀerences in the medians
of the residuals of the quality and price measures, between the pre-distress and distress periods are
statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level of signiﬁcance using a one-sided Fisher test for a
non-parametric two sample comparison. Second, during bankruptcy both measures of quality and
price increase relative to the distress period. However, only the diﬀerences in the medians of the
quality measures for the bankruptcy and distress periods are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This initial evidence is interesting, but it does not consider ﬁrms with a high probability of
default that do not enter into bankruptcy nor does it control for the endogeneity of distress or
bankruptcy. These simple diﬀerences may thus be driven by other exogenous changes and merely
related to ﬁrm bankruptcy. We now turn to the task of disentangling whether bankruptcy and
ﬁnancial distress aﬀect ﬁrms’ decisions after controlling for other exogenous demand and supply
changes and the endogeneity of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition itself.
3.2 Probability of default and bankruptcy
In our analysis of default probability we examine both ﬁrms that manage to avoid bankruptcy and
to those that do not. We construct a direct measure of the probability of default and use this to
examine ﬁrm quality and pricing decisions. In addition our analysis takes into account that this
probability of default might be endogenous. The probability of default is based on the Bharath
and Shumway (2008) probability of default measure which, in turn, is based on the Merton (1974)
model.12 The idea is to compare the ﬁrm to a bond using the standard deviation of its equity









 where V is the economic value of the ﬁrm, D is the economic value of the ﬁrm’s debt
and T is the forecasting horizon. This model uses a system of nonlinear equations to numerically infer the economic
value of the ﬁrm and its standard deviation from the value of equity. Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that a naïve
version of this default probability performs better in hazard models and in out-of-sample forecasts than the one that
uses the numerical solution to obtain the economic value of the ﬁrm and its standard deviation. They proxy the eco-
nomic value of debt, D, to its face value F; they proxy the standard deviation of debt value with  =0 05+025
, they proxy the economic value of the ﬁrm V as the sum of the face value of the debt plus the value of equity, E,
implying that the standard deviation of the ﬁrm value can be derived as  = 
+  + 
+  . They also replace
the expected return,  , with the last period return, −1 Thus, the naïve Merton’s default probability, for a one













This expression is based on stock price and debt value information only.
15and the value of its debt to construct its probability of default. Daily stock price information was
obtained from CRSP and short and long term debt were obtained from quarterly Compustat. At
least 25 stock price observations were required to construct the standard deviation of equity.
Our measure of default probability diﬀers slightly from Bharath and Shumway (2008) in two
ways. First, we construct the default probability quarterly rather than annually. Second, we
incorporate as an additional component of long run debt the underfunding of pension liabilities13
given their importance in airline default.14 A default probability of, say, 50% is interpreted as
implying that the ﬁrm has a 50% of chance of entering bankruptcy in the next quarter.
We impute the probability of default when a corporation owns more than one airline in the
sample, as is the case of AMR, which owns American Airlines and American Eagle Airlines. In this
case, the probability of default was calculated for AMR and used for both companies. A similar
situation occurs in the case of mergers. When one airline buys another, the subsequent probability
of default for both is constructed using the information of the consolidated ﬁrm after the merger
takes place.
We choose Merton’s default probability over other traditional distress measure, like Altman’s
Z, because the latter is not robust to changes in industry ﬁnancial structure, such as the increasing
trend in operational leases (see Gavazza 2010). Altman’s Z is constructed using Multi Discriminant
Analysis (MDA), a technique similar to econometric regressions that selects the ﬁnancial ratios
with the best ability to discriminate between distressed and not distressed ﬁrms. Using MDA
for the airline industry, Chow, Gritta and Leung (1991) found that interest coverage, revenue to
shareholders’ equity and equity to total assets were the most important factors among the ﬁnancial
ratios examined for predicting airlines’ default.15 The ﬁnal computation of the distress indicator
assigned each of the three ratios a weight equivalent to a reduced-form parameter in the regression
analysis. Nevertheless, changing trends in the ﬁnancing of aircraft makes all of the parameters,
especially the interest coverage, quite unstable.
13‘Pension net liabilities’ was constructed from BTS as ‘pension liabilities’ minus ‘special funds’. If this was less
than zero it was replaced by zero because the plan is overfunded. ‘Pension liabilities’ are the liabilities that a
carrier has due to its deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. ‘Special funds’ contain pension assets and other minor assets.
Nevertheless, in the data it can be seen that airlines that do not have a deﬁned beneﬁt plan almost invariably have
special funds equal to zero, so ‘special funds’ is a good approximation of pension assets.
14Not incorporating pension liabilities or even the long run debt in the default probability does not aﬀect the
results of the paper.
15Interest coverage was the single most relevant ﬁnancial ratio in their estimation.
16We use Merton’s default probability because it is a more structural measure of default proba-
bility, given that it is theoretically derived and depends on basic elements of a ﬁrm’s risk like its
debt and the standard deviation of its equity. In addition, in preliminary regressions, Merton’s
default probability predicted the bankruptcy episodes in our sample far better than Altman’s Z in
our sample. Finally, the advantages of Merton’s default probability over Altman’s Z apply to any
other ﬁnancial ratio given that Altman’s Z is composed of multiple ﬁnancial ratios.16
In our analysis of bankruptcy, we examine all ﬁrm-quarters for ﬁrm that are in bankruptcy and
compare them to observations in which ﬁrms are in high ﬁnancial distress but not in bankruptcy.
These high distress ﬁrm quarters include ﬁrms that eventually enter bankruptcy but also ﬁrms that
do not enter bankruptcy. Bankruptcy takes value 1 when a ﬁrm declares itself (or is declared) in
Chapter 11 and zero otherwise. There are 59 ﬁrm-quarter observations where the ﬁrm is in Chapter
11 bankruptcy in our sample, but there are no Chapter 7 episodes.17
For the non-bankruptcy sample that we compare to the bankrupt sample, we use ﬁrm years in
which the ﬁrms are highly distressed. Some of the distressed ﬁrms enter into bankruptcy; others
remain distressed in this subsample. Given that we are using ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects we are estimating
ad i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerence where the treatment is being bankrupt and the control state is ﬁnancial
distress.
The criterion for selecting distressed ﬁrms is that our measure of default probability exceeds
10%. We select this criterion balancing not dropping too many non-bankrupt observations while
ensuring that the included are, on average, quite distressed, with an average default probability of
60%. Nevertheless, relaxing this criterion does not change the results.18 We get a ﬁnal sample of
192 observations: 59 bankrupt ﬁrm-quarters and 133 distressed ﬁrm-quarters.
16Merton’s default probability is also potentially more accurate than bond ratings given that bonds rating barely
vary over time, and are frequently adjusted downward after a default.
17Independence Air did enter Chapter 7 but shrank to a small size before actually entering Chapter 7 so they could
not be included given that they do not satisfy the 1% market share requirement of the ATCR.
18All the results hold if we drop observations with default probability lower than 5%, 15% and 20%, or even
higher. However, results do get weaker if we do not drop any observations. This is to be expected because when
dropping observations with default probability lower than 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% the average default probability of
the non-bankrupt ﬁrms in the sample is 54%, 60%, 67% and 71% respectively. Comparing those observations with
the bankrupt ﬁrm quarters is correctly comparing distressed ﬁrms with bankrupt ﬁrms. However, when we do not
drop any observations the average default probability of the non-bankrupt ﬁrm quarters is 14%, which implies that
these ﬁrm-quarters are not that distressed and thus are not good candidates to be compared with bankrupt ﬁrm
quarters.
173.3 Demand and supply variables
To identify any eﬀect of distress or default on ﬁrm quality it is critically important to control for
demand and supply shocks. To construct demand shift variables (denoted W above), we use the
average income and unemployment rate per state-quarter from the BEA.19 We use these state level
variables in the following way for each airline. For each airline, we compute the total number of
passengers originating from each state for each quarter, and divide them by the total number of
passengers that the ﬁrm carried in that quarter. This gives us the percentage of origin passen-
gers that each state represents for each airline. These percentages are lagged one period, to avoid
potential endogeneity problems, and are multiplied by the average income and unemployment of
each state in each quarter, yielding weighted average income and unemployment at origin for each
airline. We do the same for destinations. To minimize the collinearity between weighted unem-
p l o y m e n ta n dw e i g h t e di n c o m ew eu s ea v e r a g ei n c o m ew e i g h t e da tt h eo r i g i ns t a t ea n dt h ea v e r a g e
unemployment rate weighted at the destination state.20 We call these variables local income and
local unemployment.
Another variable that shifts the demand of a ﬁrm is the competition it faces. Our measure of
competition is the weighted average number of competitors that an airline faces by route. We do
the computation in a similar way as the one for weighted income and unemployment. We sort the
data by route and see how many airlines operate on a given route, measured as a pair of cities.21
Then, we weight routes using lagged passengers to obtain our measure of competition.
Our supply variables, denoted as X in the previous equations, are based on cost items that vary
over time. The two most important supply variables are oil prices and the eﬃciency with which each
airline uses fuel. "Oil Fuel Cost" is constructed as the actual price per gallon that an airline pays
in a quarter. This is obtained by dividing the total fuel cost of an airline by the number of gallons
it used in that quarter. This price measure has two advantages over the oil spot price per gallon.
First, it incorporates airlines’ fuel hedging strategies as this price incorporates future or forward
contracts the airlines signed. Second, it is not perfectly collinear with the time ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus,
the overall economic conditions are captured by time ﬁxed eﬀects while the speciﬁcs conditions on
19Average income is in thousands of dollars. Income and yield are in 2009 dollars (cents).
20Including both variables at the origin or destination states does not aﬀect the results.
21We exclude airlines that transport less than 100 passengers in a route-quarter, because they represent irrelevant
competition.
18an airline’s oil price are captured by this variable. Eﬃciency, on the other hand, is deﬁned as the
number of ASM (available seat miles) an airline produces for each gallon of fuel they use. The more
eﬃciently airlines use oil, due to new aircraft technology, the lower the costs of the ﬁrm.
Another variable that inﬂuences supply, through cost, is average distance of ﬂights. The longer
the distance that an airplane ﬂies the lower the cost of the ﬂight per mile, because the take-oﬀ and
landing use more fuel, and thus ﬁrms with shorter ﬂights will look less eﬃcient all other things
equal. This variable can be obtained by dividing Domestic Revenue passenger miles (which is the
product of passengers and miles) by total enplaned passengers.22
Finally, we consider a variable that might aﬀect both demand and supply conditions: “Conges-
tion”, which measures how congested the markets in which an airline operates are on average. Given
that we are measuring positive characteristics as increasing variables, we will construct a measure
of decongestion rather than congestion. To construct this measure we take the average percentage
of on time ﬂights (arriving within 15 minutes of the scheduled arrival time) of each airport, for
each ﬁrm, excluding the ﬁrm’s own ﬂights. Then, we weight each airport by the lagged number of
passengers for each ﬁrm. With this variable we can control for airport quality independent of the
ﬁrm itself.
Congestion might aﬀect the ﬁrms’ pricing decision, because operating in congested markets is
similar to facing capacity constraints in that the ﬁrm cannot increase supply as much as it would
want to. Since operating under capacity constraints makes competition softer, we expect that
(de)congestion should increase (decrease) prices. Congestion might aﬀect demand as well, because
congestion might reﬂect high consumer valuation for those markets. Finally, congestion can also
aﬀect our measures of quality, because it is easier to improve on-time performance and decrease the
rate of mishandled baggage in less congested markets. Thus by controlling for congestion we will
n o tp e n a l i z eaﬁrm because it operates a large proportion of its ﬂights in congested airports like
JFK or La Guardia. Given that the only quality supply shift variable is decongestion, which also
aﬀects supply and demand, we cannot instrument quality.
22Controlling for this variable is important because Low Cost Carriers (LCC) typically have similar yields to major
carriers in the data, but after adjusting for the average miles per ﬂight, which are lower for LCCs, we ﬁnd that their
yield is actually lower.
193.4 Variable summary statistics
Table 3 presents summary statistics for all our variables for the full sample of ﬁrms. Table 3 shows
the 10th percentile, mean, 90th percentile, standard deviation and number of observations for the
variables shown in the left column. The data consists of an unbalanced panel of 21 airlines for 48
quarters (1st quarter of 1997 to 4th quarter of 2008).
Insert Table 3 here
The main message that Table 3 conveys is that there is high variation in our measures of quality
and default probability over the sample. Note that the statistics on default probability do not
include the quarters the ﬁrm is actually in bankruptcy, as we cannot calculate Merton’s default
probability for companies without publicly traded stock. Despite not covering these quarters, the
default probability goes from 0% at the 10th percentile to 69.2% at the 90th percentile. The
maximum for this variable is close to 1.
3.5 Financial condition and identiﬁcation
One of the central problems that researchers face when attributing eﬀects to ﬁnancial variables
like the probability of default or bankruptcy is that these variables are endogenous and potentially
related to ﬁrm quality and prices. Thus we face a typical identiﬁcation problem. Having low quality
might have driven the airline into distress or bankruptcy in the ﬁrst place. A similar argument can
be made for high or low prices. Using airline ﬁxed eﬀects and time ﬁxed eﬀects partially mitigates
this problem but clearly does not solve it.
We solve the identiﬁcation problem using instrumental variables. To solve the problem, we need
an instrument that aﬀect the probability of default, but does not aﬀect prices, quantity or quality.
This also needs to hold for bankruptcy. We use the percentage of liquidable assets as instrument for
both ﬁnancial conditions. In our ﬁrst analysis as default probability and bankruptcy are analyzed
separately only one instrument is needed for identiﬁcation.
The percentage of liquidable assets proxies for the tangibility of assets and follows Berger et. al.
(1996) formulation. Berger et al. used data from Lexis/Nexis on the proceeds from discontinued
operations reported by a sample of COMPUSTAT ﬁr m sf r o m1 9 8 4t o1 9 9 3t oc o m p u t eh o wm u c h
20the ﬁrm’s assets were worth in case of liquidation. They found that a dollar of book value yields 72
cents in liquidation value for accounts receivables, 55 cents in liquidation value for inventory and
54 cents in liquidation value for their ﬁxed assets. Our variable percentage of liquidable assets is
the expected amount that can be recovered in case of liquidation, using those parameters, divided
by the book value of assets.
The percentage of liquidable assets captures what proportion of a ﬁrm’s assets creditors can
recover in case the ﬁrm is liquidated. The more creditors can obtain in case of liquidation, the more
they are willing to lend to the ﬁrm. Thus a higher percentage of liquidable assets is likely to be
related with higher leverage and also with a higher probability of default and bankruptcy.
We are not the ﬁrst to use the percentage of liquidable assets as an instrument for a ﬁnancial
variable. Campello (2006) uses the percentage of liquidable assets, following Berger et al. speciﬁ-
cation, to instrument leverage when analyzing the eﬀect of leverage on ﬁrms’ sales growth. We just
go one step ahead and use it to instrument default probability and bankruptcy directly.
Conceptually, the percentage of liquidable assets is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. It
is unlikely that having more valuable assets in case of liquidation will aﬀect directly the quality of
a ﬁrm’s product or its prices. What can be argued is that this measure of tangibility has a relation
with performance, because better performance can lead a ﬁrm to acquire more ﬁxed assets, which
increase the percentage of liquidable assets. In that case, our instrument could directly aﬀect the
ﬁrms’ real outcomes, because it might be capturing unmeasured productivity to the extent that our
controls are not perfect. Nevertheless, this is unlikely, because we observe that higher percentage
of liquidable assets is positively related with high ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, states in which
productivity is unlikely to be high. Moreover, Almeida and Campello(2007), and Campello (2007)
(see Table 3 of Campello (2007)) demonstrate that a ﬁrm’s pledgable assets are independent of its
ﬁnancial constraints and that there is no direct relationship between a ﬁrm’s percentage of liquidable
assets and a ﬁrm’s performance. Campello (2007) shows that the only relationship between these
two variables is through the ﬁnancing channel. Thus, the ﬁrm’s percentage of liquidable assets is a
good instrument for ﬁnancial conditions as is unrelated to a ﬁrm’s performance. In addition, any
story that tries to directly relate the percentage of liquidable assets with product quality in one
direction faces the hurdle that using the same instrument product quality is shown to have opposite
eﬀects in ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy.
21Speciﬁcally, in the airline industry, our measure of percentage of liquidable assets captures not
only an increase in debt capacity of the ﬁrm, but also the increase in ﬁxed assets that occurs when
ﬁrms acquire aircraft using secured debt. According to Benmelech and Bergman (2009) “...secured
debt has become the primary source of external ﬁnance of aircraft by airlines in the US.” Simply
put, secured ﬁnancing implies that an airline issue securities to buy aircraft and back up those
securities using the aircraft bought as collateral. Thus, when a ﬁrm acquires new aircraft the ﬁxed
assets of the ﬁrm increases and so does our measure of percentage of liquidable assets.23 The debt
of the ﬁrm and the default probability are likely to be higher as well. Thus, through this channel,
a ﬁrm with higher percentage of liquidable assets is also a ﬁrm that is more likely to default in the
future given its incremental level of debt.
The exclusion restriction of the percentage of liquidable assets can also be justiﬁed when the
secured debt channel is at work. According to Gavazza (2010) a ﬁrm does not continuously buy
or sell aircraft to adjust its capacity. The decision of buying or selling aircraft has wide inaction
ranges due to the high transaction costs involved with it. According to his model, a ﬁrm acquires an
aircraft only if it has a high enough productivity shock such that it is worth it to adjust its capacity
in the long run (rather than adjusting it on the short run using operational leases). One consequence
of his model is that getting rid of aircraft is diﬃcult when the ﬁrm needs to downsize its ﬂeet. Thus,
a ﬁr mt h a ta c q u i r e da i r c r a f ti nt h ep a s ti sm o r ev u l n e r a b l et oa d v e r s es h o c k sb e c a u s ei tm i g h tb e
highly indebted and cannot sell their aircraft to adapt its capacity quickly. Yet, in this story, the
initial factors that might have lead a ﬁrm to the purchase an aircraft are not contemporaneously
related with the factors driving the ﬁrm into ﬁnancial distress, which occurs ex post. They cannot
be contemporaneous because a ﬁrm facing a negative shock (which is the most likely scenario in
ﬁnancial distress) will not be likely to acquire any aircraft. Therefore, the positive relationship that
the percentage of liquidable assets and default probability display in our data is likely to be due
to the fact that the percentage of liquidable assets was high from a period previous to ﬁnancial
distress and remains high thereafter.
The “buying ﬁrst with potential distress later” story is consistent with the persistence patterns
of the percentage of liquidable assets and default probability that we ﬁnd in our data. When
23When aircrafts are acquired or there is a ﬁnancial lease contract which implies that by the end of the lease the
aircraft will be possessed by the airline, then the aircrafts appear in the airlines’ balance sheets. When an airline
signs an operational lease, that transaction is oﬀ the balance sheet (see Morrell 2007). Therefore, our measure of
percentage of liquidable assets is not aﬀected by operational leases which are not generally acknowledged as a cause
of ﬁnancial distress.
22running a regression between the percentage of liquidable assets on its lag using ﬁrm and time ﬁxed
eﬀects as controls, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃc i e n to ft h el a gi s0 . 7 8 ,w h i l ew h e nd o i n gt h es a m ea n a l y s i s
for default probability is just 0.21 (both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%). This implies that
the percentage of liquidable assets evolves slowly through time, consistent with Gavazza’s research
showing inaction bands and with the fact that the distress is much less predictable.2425
While we argue that the percentage of liquidable assets is a good instrument, we conduct an ad-
ditional set of tests to further allay concerns. In additional tests we substitute out for quantity (total
enplaned passengers) in the ﬁnancial condition equation, and vice versa, and thus "borrow" addi-
tional instruments - local income and unemployment and competition - from our demand equation
to the ﬁnancial condition equation. In other words, rather than estimating the ﬁnancial condition
and demand equations, we estimate the impact that percentage of liquidable assets, competition,
local income and unemployment have, in equilibrium,o nt h eﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition and total
enplaned passengers, and these instrumented versions are used in the system of equations. The
advantage of this approach is that we can use instruments from an overidentiﬁed equation (the de-
mand equation, which has 3 instruments) to increase the number of instruments on other equations
(the ﬁnancial condition equations, which are exactly identiﬁed). The drawback of this approach is
that we cannot estimate the true equations that describe the demand and ﬁnancial conditions, but
only the impact of exogenous variables on their equilibrium values. As estimating the demand and
ﬁnancial condition equation is not our goal, we do not consider this a major drawback in designing
this additional set of tests. 26 Local income is shown to be an additional strong instrument —and
predictor- for the default probability and bankruptcy. The main results of the paper are robust to
this alternative approach.
24This argument does not contradict Eisenfelt and Rampini (2008) who argue that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress are
the ones that lease more and buy less. Our argument is about how a ﬁrm enters into distress. They analyze what
happens when the ﬁrm is already distressed.
25A less obvious channel that could potentially violate the exclusion restriction is the following. An airline could
acquire more assets to expand faster to other markets. In this scenario, the percentage of liquidable assets may be
correlated with faster market expansion. To the extent that expanding faster reduces the airline’s ability to provide
high quality it can be argued that the percentage of liquidable assets may have a direct eﬀect on quality. We test for
this potential eﬀect and ﬁnd that even after controlling for revenue growth in the quality and price equations, the
eﬀects of instrumented ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy on quality and prices were unaltered.
26In a simple setting of supply and demand our approach is analogous to run the price and a quantity equations
on both supply and demand shifters rather than estimating the demand and supply equations.
234 Results: Multivariate Evidence
Before estimating our simultaneous equation system, we ﬁrst present some simple regression statis-
tics for quality and pricing. We regress quality and price on quarterly time and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
and then examine the residuals of this simple regression for diﬀerent percentiles of default proba-
bility (which is of course not included in the regression). The idea is to see if quality and price
exhibit trends that are associated with ﬁnancial distress after removing quarterly time and ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects.
Insert Table 4 here
Examining the results in Table 4 we can see that price per mile declines sharply and monoton-
ically with a ﬁrm’s default probability by quartile. There is an increase in price (yield) in bank-
ruptcy relative to quartile 4, but not back to the levels of the other quartiles. The results for quality
show that the inverse of mishandled bags decreases in quartiles 3 and 4 and sharply increases in
bankruptcy. On-time performance also shows a sharp increase in bankruptcy relative to previous
q u a r t i l e s . T h u st h em o s ts t r i k i n gf a c tt h a tw eﬁnd in this table is the sharp increase in quality
when ﬁrms move into bankruptcy. Quality is the highest when ﬁrms are in bankruptcy, consistent
with ﬁrms increasing quality as they try to retain customers and emerge from Chapter 11.
Of course as we noted earlier, ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy are endogenous states and are
correlated with other exogenous factors. Thus we now turn to examining quality and pricing when
controlling for the endogeneity of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy through simultaneous equations
regressions. We analyze separately the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy on product quality
and prices to avoid imposing any value on the default probability when a ﬁrm is in bankruptcy.
These results are presented in sections 4.1 and 4.2. In section 4.3, we analyze the diﬀerent eﬀects
of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy at the route level for the only quality measure available at that
level of aggregation (on-time performance). Finally, in the appendix, we show the results when a
value of zero is imposed on the default probability when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy (a value of 1
when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy would indistinguishable from bankruptcy itself) and the impact of
ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy are estimated simultaneously on the ﬁrm’s decision variables.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a subtle distinction needs to be made in the interpreta-
tion of the default probability and bankruptcy when they are instrumented. When instrumented,
24the default probability has to be interpreted as the predicted probability that a ﬁrm enters into
bankruptcy the next period, while bankruptcy, when instrumented, has to be interpreted as the
predicted probability of being in bankruptcy rather than entering into bankruptcy.
4.1 Financial distress
We now examine in a multivariate setup how distress aﬀects ﬁrm’s quality and pricing (yield)
decisions. For quality we examine two diﬀerent quality supply decisions: mishandled baggage (the
inverse of mishandled bags per 1000 customers) and on-time performance. The key variable we use
to examine ﬁnancial distress is Bharath and Shumway naïve probability of default. Table 5 presents
results from estimating equations (1a’) to (4a’).
We estimate the system using three stage least squares (3SLS) to take advantage of the potential
error correlation between the sets of equations. We use ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects to isolate ﬁrms’ within
variation in their pricing and quality strategies. We also use time ﬁxed eﬀects to absorb time-varying
shocks that aﬀect all ﬁrms’ quality and prices and that might be correlated with ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
distress. We are able to identify temporary shocks from ﬁnancial distress because ﬁnancial distress
aﬀects diﬀerent ﬁrms at diﬀerent points in time. Lastly, we express our constructed variables in
logarithms, whenever possible, to be able to interpret our results as elasticities. We use logarithms
of price (yield), oil fuel cost price, eﬃciency and income.27
Econometrically we identify the direct eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on price and quality by instru-
menting price, quantity and the default probability. The instruments that satisfy the exclusion
restriction for the price equation are average miles per ﬂight, oil fuel cost and eﬃciency; for the
quantity equation are competition, income and unemployment; and for the default probability is
the percentage of liquidable assets. Our tests show that all the instruments but unemployment are
strong.
Table 5: The Eﬀect of Distress on Firm Pricing and Firm Quality
Table 5 shows that ﬁrms’ price and quality are negatively aﬀected by their ﬁnancial distress as
27Some variables like average miles per ﬂight, competition, percentage of liquidable assets, unemployment and
decongestion have a straight forward interpretation, so we do not express them in logarithms. We do not express
Quantity in logarithms because the within diﬀerence in passengers through time is close to zero in logarithms. For
instance, the diﬀerence between 2 million and 2.01 million passengers is almost zero in logarithms. Finally, our
quality measures are already in ratios, so the logarithmic transformation does not provide any further insight.
25captured by the default probability. These results are consistent the conﬂict of interest between
equity holders and debt holders that arises in ﬁnancial distress. These results as a whole are
inconsistent with a cash constrained ﬁrm being unable to invest in quality as a ﬁrm does not need
cash to cut prices.
To understand the economic impact of these results we compare the quality and price decisions
of a ﬁrm with zero default probability with itself when it is highly distressed, with a 60% of
default probability. Thus the parameter of default probability has to be multiplied by 0.6 for its
interpretation. We select this number because it will allow us to compare our results for ﬁnancial
distress with the later results on bankruptcy, for which sample ﬁrms have on average a 60% default
probability when they are not in bankruptcy.
According to the estimates reported in Table 5, a ﬁrm that has a probability of 60% of going
bankrupt next period charges 28.3% less than a healthy ﬁrm with zero default probability. The
eﬀect on quality is also large. A ﬁrm with a 60% probability of defaulting next period decreases the
inverse of bags mishandled by 0.058, which represents 0.7 standard deviations, with respect to a
ﬁrm with zero default probability. Thus ﬁnancial distress represents a change from the sample mean
of 5.8 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers to 7.7 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers. Similarly,
a ﬁrm with a 60% probability of defaulting next quarter decreases its on-time performance by 0.034
which represents 0.55 standard deviations, with respect to a ﬁrm with zero default probability.
Assuming that the overall percentage of late ﬂights remains at its sample mean, ﬁnancial distress
represents a change from late ﬂi g h t sa r r i v i n g5 2m i n u t e sl a t e ,a tt h es a m p l em e a n ,t o6 5m i n u t e s
late.
The results for our control variables also make economic sense. In the pricing equation, prices
are higher when quantity increases, when oil prices are higher and are lower the less congested are
the airports in which they operate. Prices also decrease with average miles per ﬂight and with fuel
eﬃciency. Lastly, both measures of quality increase when airports are less congested, but only the
eﬀect on baggage handling rate is statistically signiﬁcant.
In non-reported regressions the estimated coeﬃcient of default probability on price is -4.5 percent
when default probability is treated as exogenous. Though this result is statistically signiﬁcant it is
an order of magnitude smaller than the estimated eﬀect when default probability is instrumented.28
28Lee (2010), treating ﬁnancial distress as exogenous, found a similar decrease of between 3 to 5% in airline prices
in the pre-bankruptcy periods. Her result is in agreement with our non instrumented result.
26Not instrumenting ﬁnancial distress leads to a downward biased coeﬃcients in the estimation of ﬁrm
product quality. When ﬁnancial distress is not instrumented its eﬀe c to nb o t hq u a l i t ym e a s u r e si s
smaller, in absolute value, and looses statistical signiﬁcance.
Table 6: The Eﬀect of Distress with additional instruments
Table 6 presents the results of additional tests that demonstrate that our previous results are
robust to choices of instruments. Table 6 substitutes out for quantity (total enplaned passengers)
in the default probability equation thus "borrowing" the additional instruments - local income and
unemployment and competition - from our quantity demanded equation. We also substitute out
for default probability in the quantity equation. In other words, we are replacing equation (3a’)
into (4a’) and vice versa. Local income in particular is shown to be an additional strong instrument
for the default probability and is exogenous to ﬁrm-level quality and prices.
We ﬁnd very similar results to those in Table 5. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we can see that
the eﬀect on an increase in default probability is associated with a decrease in ﬁrm quality - more
bags are mishandled and on-time performance decreases. Column 3 also shows prices also decrease
in ﬁnancial distress.
4.1.1 Financial distress and market share
In this section we explore the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress on a ﬁrm’s market share. If rival ﬁrms
can perfectly observe the ﬁrm’s price, and are willing to match the ﬁrm’s prices for all quantities,
then there may be no gain to cutting price for the ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrm even in the short run.
However, while prices can be observed, rivals cannot observe the quantity of seats sold at any given
price as discussed earlier. Table 7 thus adds a market share equation as an additional equation to
the previous system estimated in Table 5. Market share is measured in terms of domestic operating
passenger revenue. This market share equation was run in the same system as in Table 5 but
presented separately in order to provide the intuition of why prices go down when there is distress:
ﬁrms increase their market share by cutting their prices.
Table 7: Financial Distress and Market Share
T a b l e7s h o w st h a tp r i c e sa ﬀect ﬁrm market shares negatively. Thus, it is consistent with
distressed ﬁrms gaining market share in the short run by cutting their prices. In addition the
27coeﬃcient on default probability is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one-percent level,
which means that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress gain market share for reasons other than price reductions
which may include giving away extra frequent ﬂyer miles, a practice United used while it was in
ﬁnancial troubles, when it gave away triple the regular ﬂight miles.
4.2 Bankruptcy
We now examine the impact on price and quality of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. We compare bankrupt
ﬁrm-quarters with highly distressed ﬁrm-quarters - including both ﬁrms that enter bankruptcy,
their bankrupt periods and their high distress quarters, and also ﬁrms that are highly distressed
but do not enter bankruptcy. We estimate a similar set of equations as for the ﬁnancial distress
case, but now we use a bankruptcy indicator rather than the probability of default as the relevant
ﬁnancial condition. Thus we estimate equations (5a’) to (8a’) using three stages least squares. The
results of are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Quality, Firm Pricing and Endogenous Bankruptcy
Table 8 shows that both of our measures of quality, the inverse of bags mishandled and the on-
time performance, increase in bankruptcy relative to the distressed ﬁrm-quarters examined (which
have a 60% default probability on average). Prices continue to fall in bankruptcy relative to ﬁnancial
distress. Low prices during bankruptcy are consistent with lower short-term cost pressures as
interest is deferred via the automatic stay provision when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy.
The percentage of liquidable assets is a strong and signiﬁcant predictor of bankruptcy even in this
small subsample (192 ﬁrm-quarter observations). The rationale behind this pattern is the following.
Firms on their way to bankruptcy reduce both ﬁxed assets and short term assets. However, ﬁrms
with a higher proportion of ﬁxed assets ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to avoid bankruptcy as they cannot
generate immediate cash from those assets. Thus, the higher the percentage of ﬁxed, non-liquidable
assets a ﬁrm has, the lower its chances of avoiding bankruptcy when facing a negative shock.
The eﬀect of instrumented bankruptcy on both quality measures is positive and strongly sig-
niﬁcant. When a ﬁrm goes from ﬁnancial distress into bankruptcy, it increases the inverse of bags
mishandled by 0.082 which represents a one standard deviation increase. Thus bankruptcy rep-
resents a change from the estimated 7.7 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers in ﬁnancial distress
28to 5.3 mishandled bags per 1000 passengers. Similarly, a ﬁrm in bankruptcy increases its on-time
performance by 0.037 which represents 0.6 standard deviations, with respect to when it was ﬁnan-
cially distressed. Thus bankruptcy represents a change from late ﬂi g h t sa r r i v i n g6 5m i n u t e sl a t e
in ﬁnancial distress to just 43 minutes late. In sum, ﬁrms in bankruptcy actually increase their
quality slightly with respect to when they are ﬁnancially healthy. The intuition is that ﬁrms during
bankruptcy are trying hard to regain the conﬁdence of consumers and convince the bankruptcy
judge that they are viable in the long run. The increased quality is also consistent with the ﬁrm
investing in its reputation for the future.
We conduct an additional analysis where we explore whether our results are robust to choices
of instruments. As in Table 6, we substitute out for quantity (total enplaned passengers) in the
bankruptcy equation and we substitute the bankruptcy equation in the quantity equation. This is
equivalent to replace equation (7a’) into (8a’) and vice versa. These results are reported in Table 9.
Table 9: The Eﬀect of Bankruptcy with additional instruments
The results in Table 9 are very similar to those in Table 8. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 9, we
can see that bankruptcy is associated with an increase in ﬁrm quality.
Overall these results on quality in bankruptcy as compared to quality in ﬁnancial distress are
unique. We show that quality increases in bankruptcy relative to ﬁnancial distress. Our results that
prices fall with ﬁnancial distress are robust and agree with Borenstein and Rose (1995) and Busse
(2002), although our ﬁndings suggest a diﬀerent mechanism by which prices are lower in ﬁnancial
distress than the arguments proposed earlier. Borenstein and Rose (1995) argue that consumers
might anticipate the ﬁrm’s incentive to reduce quality and thus lower their demand, implying a
reduction in prices. In our setting even after controlling for ﬁrm demand we ﬁnd that ﬁrms reduce
price in the presence of ﬁnancial distress. This mechanism is consistent with ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress having a higher discount rate which gives ﬁrm managers incentives to cut prices in the
short run in order to generate cash by stealing market shares from its competitors. This proposed
mechanism is similar to Busse (2002) as she also argues that ﬁrms in distress cut prices in order to
get higher proﬁts in the short run even if this triggers a price war in the future. The diﬀerence is
that she attributes the short run gains to gaining ticket sales at the expense of future sales while
we show they are compatible with stealing market share from competitors.
294.3 Route Level Analysis
Our previous results are conducted at the airline level as this is the level where bankruptcy and
ﬁnancial distress aﬀect ﬁrms. Another alternative is to estimate the eﬀects on individual ﬁrm routes.
The route level analysis has been used recently by Ciliberto and Schenone (2010b) (CS) to analyze
bankruptcy. This approach has advantages and disadvantages relative to analysis at the ﬁrm level.
One advantage of the route-level analysis is that more closely matched bankrupt and non-bankrupt
pairs can be obtained. As more data is used in the estimation the precision of the estimates can
improve. A second advantage is that at the route level it may be possible to detect how ﬁrms alter
their product quality in response to ﬁnancial conditions. For instance, we can explore whether ﬁrms
that improve product quality in bankruptcy shed problematic routes, improve the quality on the
existing routes, or do both.
The route-level analysis, however, has several shortcomings. One disadvantage is that out of the
three decision variables that we analyze at the ﬁrm level (i.e: quality of mishandled bags, quality of
on-time performance and prices) only on-time performance can be analyzed properly at the route
level. The BTS does not provide information on mishandled bags at the route level. Additionally,
the only information about prices at the route level that the BTS provides comes from a sample
of tickets (Databank 1A). This sample is collected at the time the ticket is used, not at the time
it is purchased. Thus for a ﬂight operated during ﬁnancial distress the ticket prices are likely to
reﬂect a combination of distress and pre-distress pricing strategies. Similarly, for a ﬂight operated
in bankruptcy the ticket prices are likely to be capturing both distress and bankruptcy pricing
strategies. Therefore, there is not a good way of isolating non-distress from distress, and distress
from bankruptcy, on prices at the route level.
An additional disadvantage, which is related to the ﬁrst one, is that by analyzing a single
ﬁrm decision (on-time performance) we lose statistical power. We lose the beneﬁt of estimating
more equations in a system that captures macro-economic shocks which can help in estimating the
standard errors more accurately when there is error correlation among the equations.
Most importantly, the advantage of having more data at the route-level may not be relevant
for most of our analysis as ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy are ﬁrm-level phenomena. The errors
from the route-level analysis are unlikely to be independent - implying that the advantage of using
more observations might disappear when properly clustering standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
30With the above caveats in mind, we still explore the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy
on on-time performance at the route level. The results are presented in Table 10. Panel A of Table 10
presents the results for ﬁnancial distress and Panel B presents the results for bankruptcy. Columns
1 to 4 use as dependent variable our measure of on time performance at the route level. These
columns try to replicate, at the route level, our previous analysis at the ﬁrm level. The independent
variables are the instrumented ﬁnancial condition (i.e: default probability or bankruptcy) at the
ﬁrm level and the instrumented total enplaned passengers at the route level. The instruments
are percentage of liquidable assets, oil prices, eﬃciency, competition, income and unemployment.29
The estimation procedure is two-stage least squares. In the regressions, we weight observations
inversely corresponding to the number of routes each carrier operates in a quarter, in order not
to over-represent carriers that operate a large number of routes given bankruptcy and ﬁnancial
distress are ﬁrm-level phenomena. Columns 1 and 2 use ﬁrm-route ﬁxed eﬀects, so they capture
the variation within routes for the same carriers. Columns 3 and 4 use ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, allowing
for variation across routes, for the same carrier, on top of the variation across time for each route-
c a r r i e r .C o l u m n s1a n d3d on o tc l u s t e rs t a n d a r de r r o r sa tt h eﬁrm level. Columns 2 and 4 cluster
the standard errors at the ﬁrm level.
The main implications from Panels A and B, column 1, are that our results at the ﬁrm level
are conﬁrmed at the ﬁrm-route level: quality goes down with ﬁnancial distress, but it goes up in
bankruptcy. However, the standard errors increase signiﬁcantly when errors are corrected by clus-
tering at the ﬁrm level (column 2). Financial distress loses statistical signiﬁcance and bankruptcy
is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
T h ei m p a c to fﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy on quality are larger, in absolute terms, in
column 1 when the estimations capture within route variation for the same ﬁr m st h a ni nc o l u m n
3 when the estimations capture within ﬁrm variation. This result implies that most of the quality
variation that ﬁnancial conditions explain is attributable to changes in quality within the same
routes rather than to variations in quality across routes.30
29Average miles per ﬂight is not useful to estimate a route-level phenomenon. In addition, decongestion was not
included as an independent variable as total emplaned passengers at the route level captures how congested a route
is. In addition, this measure did not show any explanatory power on on-time performance at the ﬁrm level. Its
inclusion does not change the results.
30Variation of quality across routes can be due to an airline’s introduction or withdrawn of routes that have
diﬀerent quality than the existing ones.
31For robustness, we also explore a diﬀerent variant of on-time performance that was used recently
by CS (2010b). In both Panels, columns 5 and 6, we change our dependent variable from on-
time performance to the total number of late ﬂights. We also include the total number of ﬂights
as explanatory variable just as in CS (2010b). Column 5 replicates CS (2010b), but using our
empirical design rather than theirs (i.e: we compare healthy to distressed ﬁrms and distress to
bankrupt ﬁrms, rather than dropping 2 quarters before bankruptcy and just analyzing bankruptcy
and we use instruments).31 Column 6 replicates column 5, but clusters the standard errors by
ﬁrms.
Column 5 conﬁrms the results from column 1: ﬂights arriving late increase in ﬁnancial distress,
but decrease in bankruptcy. Column 6 shows that at the route level, statistical signiﬁcance is lost
if we cluster at the ﬁrm level.
Two conclusions arise from the route-level analysis. First, regardless of the methodology, the
route level analysis looses statistical signiﬁcance when standard errors are not properly clustered at
the ﬁrm level. Therefore, there it is not an advantage to analyze ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy
at the route level, given ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy are ﬁrm-level problems. The additional
observations at the route level analysis provides are not independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). Once this clustering is taken into account the results are not more precise. The more
important limitation of using the route level analysis is that at the route level we are unable to use
the full system of equations and take advantage of the error correlation between the ﬁrm’s decision
variables.
Second and most importantly, using our methodology (i.e: performing separate analysis for
ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, and using instruments), the qualitative conclusions hold at the
route level. We are able to conﬁrm our conclusion that ﬁrms cut quality in ﬁnancial distress and
increase quality in bankruptcy relative to ﬁnancial distress. The route-level results for on-time
performance conﬁrm our more extensive ﬁrm-level analysis that ﬁrms cut quality in ﬁnancial distress
and increase quality in bankruptcy relative to ﬁnancial distress. The results are consistent with
ﬁrm managers having a short-term focus in ﬁnancial distress and taking actions (cutting quality
and price) that increase their chances of short-term survival at the expense of longer term gains.
31Ciliberto and Schenone (2010b) also include the eﬀect on rivals’ bankruptcy as explanatory variable. We do not
include this variable as it is not the focus of our paper.
325C o n c l u s i o n s
Our paper examines the impact of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy on airlines’ quality and pricing
decisions. We show that ﬁrms reduce quality and price when faced with ﬁnancial distress. These
ﬁndings are consistent with ﬁrms facing incentives to take advantage of other stakeholders such as
customers when faced with ﬁnancial distress, as in the model of Maksimovic and Titman (1991).
We ﬁnd diﬀerent results in bankruptcy. We document that ﬁrms increase quality relative to pre-
bankruptcy ﬁnancial distress. These ﬁndings are consistent with managerial incentives changing in
bankruptcy and with ﬁrms in Chapter 11 trying to retain customers and invest in reputation in
order to emerge as a viable company.
Our results that prices fall with ﬁnancial distress agree with Borenstein and Rose (1995) and
Busse (2002), although our ﬁndings suggest a diﬀerent mechanism by which prices are lower in
ﬁnancial distress than the arguments proposed earlier. Borenstein and Rose (1995) argue that
consumers might anticipate the ﬁrm’s incentive to reduce quality and thus lower their demand,
implying a reduction in prices. In our setting even after controlling for ﬁrms demand we ﬁnd that
ﬁrms reduce price in the presence of ﬁnancial distress in order to gain market share from competitors.
This mechanism is consistent with ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress having a higher discount rate which
gives ﬁrm managers incentives to cut prices in the short run in order to generate cash by stealing
market shares from its competitors, even though this might imply lower proﬁts in the future due to
a potential price war.
The fact that prices fall with measures of default probability also indicates that default is
involuntary in our setting and that ﬁrms adopt strategies that may allow them to recover. In
contrast, previous work on voluntary increases in ﬁnancial leverage by Chevalier (1995) and Phillips
(1995) shows that prices increase with voluntary leverage buyouts (LBOs) and management buyouts
(MBOs) in most industries. Phillips (1995) does show that in the gypsum industry there were
price cuts following the large increases in leverage. However, in this industry there was entry
by a Canadian ﬁrm and gypsum ﬁrms that undertook leveraged buyouts ended up in involuntary
ﬁnancial distress followed by bankruptcy. Our paper is unique relative to these papers as we focus
on product quality and compare supply decisions in both distressed and bankruptcy periods.
Overall our paper shows an important dimension of how a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition impacts
its real product market decisions and impacts its customers. Our analysis can be extended in
33several directions. Currently, we do not make a distinction between healthy ﬁr m st h a tc a m eo u t
of bankruptcy and ﬁrms that never have gone into bankruptcy. Their product market behavior
might diﬀer given more apprehension from customers or creditors about the ﬁrm’s reputation for
product quality. Additionally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to see if there is any
interaction between the duration of bankruptcy and a ﬁrm’s product market behavior. We leave
these extensions for future research.
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Figures 1A – 1.C 
Evolution of Quality and Prices Relative to Bankruptcy 
  “Quarters relative to Bankruptcy” are the number of quarters before and after a firm enters into 
bankruptcy. Quarter zero is defined as the quarter when firms enter into bankruptcy, if they do. The mean 
quality, in terms of inverse of mishandled baggage and on-time performance, and the mean price are 
plotted for each quarter relative to bankruptcy, for firms that entered into bankruptcy.  Figure 1A shows the 
evolution of the inverse of mishandled bags, figure 1B shows the evolution of on-time performance and 
figure 1C shows the evolution of prices.  
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Figure 1A: Inverse of Mishandled Bags  37
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Figure 1C: Price  38
  
Table 1 
Carriers and Bankruptcies 
The left column of this table presents the names of the 21 carriers that had annual operating 
revenue greater than US$20 million, had a domestic revenue market share greater than 1% and 
were publicly traded, for any quarter between the first quarter of 1997 and the fourth quarter of 
2008.  The middle column shows how many quarters each firm appears in the sample. All 21 
firms appear in consecutive quarters. The right hand side column shows how many bankruptcy 
episodes each carrier has in the sample.   
Carrier Quarters in the sample Bankruptcy episodes
ATA Airlines 15 1
Air Tran Airways 23 0
Alaska Airlines 36 0
America West Airlines 36 0
American Airlines 48 0
American Eagle Airlines 31 0
Atlantic Southeast Airlines 23 0
Comair 19 1
Continental Airlines 48 0
Delta Air Lines 48 1
ExpressJet Airlines 22 0
Frontier Airlines 14 1
Hawaiian Airlines 20 1
JetBlue Airways 23 0
Mesa Airlines 11 0
Northwest Airlines 48 1
SkyWest Airlines 23 0
Southwest 48 0
Trans World Airways* 15 0
United Airlines 48 1
US Airways 48 2
Total Airlines: 21 Total firm-quarters: 647 Bankruptcy episodes: 9  
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Table 2 
Quality, Price and Firm Financial Situation 
This table presents detrended summary statistics surrounding bankruptcy for price (yield) and 
two measures of quality:   Inverse of Mishandled Baggage and On Time Performance.   All 
measures are detrended by regressing each measure against quarterly time and firm fixed effects 
- thus all statistics omit the each firm's own average and the average for that quarter.  The 
measures below are the resulting residuals of those regressions, scaled by 10,000.  The table 
presents the median, standard deviation and number of observations of these detrended measures 
are presented according to the different financial situation of the firm-quarter.  Only firms that 
went bankrupt are included in this table.  The omitted default category is post-bankruptcy.  The 
inverse of Mishandled Baggage is defined as one divided by the rate of mishandled baggage per 
1,000 customers. On time Performance is defined as one divided by “Late”, where “Late” is the 
average flight delay by airlines of their late flights times the percentage of late flights. A flight is 
considered late it is arrives 15 minutes or later after its schedule arrival time.  Price (yield) is 
defined as Domestic Operating Passenger Revenue divided by Domestic Revenue Passenger 
Miles, expressed in 2009 US cents. Firms that went bankrupt are categorized according to time 
periods in reference with their bankruptcy episode(s). The pre-distress period contains all the 
firm-quarter observations of firms that went bankrupt 5 quarters or more before they filed into 
bankruptcy. The Distress period contains all the firm-quarter observations of firms that went 
bankrupt in the 4 quarters before they filed for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy includes the 59 firm-
quarter bankruptcy episodes in the sample.   In our sample period, only US Airways went 
bankrupt twice. Significance level (p-value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
Pre-distress Distress Bankruptcy
Detrended Within Variation
Quality: Inv. of Mishandled Baggage 29.02 -105.72*** 165.53***
(41.29) (46.87) (56.36)
Quality: On time Performance 3.92 -66.069** 16.25
(24.66) (30.20) (58.06)
Price (Yield) -7.51 -50.873*** -15.07
(14.38) (14.62) (13.89)
N 103 32 59  40
Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports sample statistics for the full sample of all airlines in our sample.   We present the 10
th 
percentile, mean, 90
th percentile, standard deviation and number of observations for the variables shown in 
the left column. The data consists of an unbalanced panel of 21 airlines for 48 quarters (1
st quarter of 1997 
to 4
th quarter of 2008). Price (yield) is defined as Domestic Operating Passenger Revenue divided by 
Domestic Revenue Passenger Miles, expressed in 2009 US cents. Inverse of Mishandled Baggage is 
defined as one divided by the rate of mishandled baggage per 1,000 customers. On time Performance is 
defined as one divided by “Late”, where “Late” is the average flight delay by airlines of their late flights 
times the percentage of late flights. A flight is considered late it is arrives 15 minutes or later after its 
schedule arrival time. Total Enplaned Passengers is the Domestic Total Passenger by segment each airline 
transports, expressed in millions. Decongestion is average on-time performance by airport excluding the 
airline’s own flights, weighted by the airline's lagged share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel 
cost per gallon after hedging contracts are considered, expressed in 2009 US dollars. Competition 
represents the weighted average number of competitors an airline faces across its markets. Efficiency is 
defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons of fuel utilized. The Default Probability is 
computed following Bharath and Schumway (2008). The information used to construct this variable comes 
from Compustat and CRSP. From the 647 observations, 59 of them are bankruptcy firm-quarters, thus we 
should have 588 Default Probability observations. However, for 9 firm-bankruptcy episodes it was possible 
to construct the Default Probability measure, as there was enough pre-bankruptcy information within those 
quarters. Additionally, there was no enough information to construct this measure for 11 non-bankruptcy 
quarters. Thus, the total number of Default Probability observations is 586. % Liquidable Assets is the 
fraction of the face value of assets a firm can recover in case of liquidation, constructed following Berger et 
al (1996).  
 
Variables 10th Pctile Mean 90th Pctile Std. Dev. N
Quality: Inv. of Mishandled Baggage 0.102 0.209 0.313 0.080 647
Quality: On time Performance 0.062 0.106 0.154 0.061 647
Price (Yield) 106.5 143.5 206.9 45.8 647
Total Enplaned Passengers 2.532 9.501 19.284 6.787 647
Default Probability 0.000 0.138 0.692 0.293 586
Bankruptcy 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.288 647
Decongestion 0.718 0.766 0.815 0.038 647
Average Miles per Flight 487.4 886.5 1225.9 276.4 647
Oil Fuel Cost 70.54 153.31 258.30 81.01 647
Competition 1.224 2.013 2.977 0.693 647
Efficiency 0.411 0.578 0.705 0.115 647
% liquidable assets 0.228 0.34 0.429 0.091 647
Income 72547 79197 85261 4968 647
Unemployment 0.041 0.051 0.062 0.085 647
Market Share 0.014 0.066 0.150 0.050 647  
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Table 4 
Quality and Price Variation with Firm Default Probability 
This table examines how quality and price (yield) vary with firm default probability and with bankruptcy.  
We present mean detrended measures of quality and price for quartiles of Merton's default probability.   To 
detrend the measures, we follow the procedure used in Table II and run separate regressions of Price, 
Inverse of Mishandled Baggage and On Time Performance on quarterly time and firm fixed effects.  The 
detrended measures are the residuals from these regressions, scaled by 10,000.  These measures thus 
represent the detrended within-firm variation of yield and the 2 measures of quality.  The mean, standard 
deviation and number of observations of these measures are presented by quartile of default probability, for 
the non-bankrupt firm quarters, and separately for the bankrupt firm-quarters. The total number of 
observations sums to 636 rather than 647 because there are 11 missing observations of default probability 
for non-bankrupt firms. Significance level (p-value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
  
Quartile of Default Probability Q 1  Q2 Q3 Q4 Bankrupt
Detrended Within Variation
Quality: Inv. of Mishandled Baggage 22.07 -5.53 -26.00 -13.74 125.5***
(29.14) (34.21) (27.87) (29.32) (56.36)
Quality: On time Performance 4.10 -16.71 18.45 -7.11 57.77
(20.38) (26.63) (23.18) (21.39) (58.06)
Price (Yield) 8.92 5.56 1.46 -25.841* -11.60
(10.75) (15.30) (14.32) (17.10) (13.88)























Table 5   42
Quality and Price with Endogenous Default Probability 
This table reports estimated relationships between quality, price (measured by yield) and financial status 
using three-stages least squares. The five dependent variables: quality: mishandled baggage, quality: on 
time performance, price, total enplaned passengers and default probability are in columns 1 to 5. Total 
enplaned passengers, default probability and price are used as right-hand-side variables as well. 
Decongestion measures the average on-time performance by airport, excluding an airline’s own flights, 
weighted by the airline's lagged share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel cost per gallon after 
hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons 
of fuel utilized.  Income and unemployment are quarterly for each state and weighted by the airline’s share 
of passengers in that state, lagged one quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of 
competitors an airline faces across its markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of 
assets a firm can recover in case of liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the 
first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008. Only non bankrupt observations are considered. All 
regressions include firm and time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-
value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quality:Inv. of Quality: Total
Mishandled On time Enplaned Default
Variables Baggage Performance ln(Price) Passengers Probability
Default Probability -0.0979*** -0.0562** -0.4717*** 9.6066***
(0.0330) (0.0259) (0.0667) (1.7962)
Total Enplaned  0.0033* -0.0018 0.0147*** 0.0189**
Passengers (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0049) (0.0089)
ln(Price) -2.3552 -0.4044**
(2.1830) (0.1650)
Decongestion 0.4303*** 0.0656 -0.6494*** 10.9724** -0.8305*
(0.0903) (0.0706) (0.1917) (4.9263) (0.4451)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0005***
(0.0001)










% Liquidable Assets 0.3626**
(0.1579)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"R-squared" 0.7692 0.7046 0.8717 0.8831 0.5818
N 577 577 577 577 577  43
Table 6 
Endogenous Default Probability with Additional Instruments 
This table reports estimated relationships between quality, price (yield) and financial status using three-stages least 
squares. The five dependent variables: quality: mishandled baggage, quality: on time performance, price, total 
enplaned passengers and default probability are in columns 1 to 5.   In this table, we substitute out for quantity (total 
enplaned passengers) in the default probability equation in column 5 and thus "borrow" the additional instruments - 
local income and unemployment and competition - from our quantity demanded equation.  We also substitute out for 
default probability in the quantity regression presented in column 4.  Total enplaned passengers, default probability 
and price are used as right-hand-side variables as well. Decongestion measures the average on-time performance by 
airport, excluding an airline’s own flights, weighted by the airline's lagged share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the 
actual fuel cost per gallon after hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) 
divided by gallons of fuel utilized.  Income and unemployment are quarterly for each state and weighted by the 
airline’s share of passengers in that state, lagged one quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of 
competitors an airline faces across its markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of assets a firm 
can recover in case of liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the first quarter of 1997 to 
the fourth quarter of 2008. Only non bankrupt observations are considered. All regressions include firm and time fixed 
effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quality:Inv. of Quality: Total
Mishandled On time Enplaned Default
Variables Baggage Performance ln(Price) Passengers Probability
Default Probability -0.0673** -0.0484* -0.3565***
(0.0332) (0.0260) (0.0724)
Total Enplaned  0.0020 -0.0028* 0.0104*
Passengers (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0054)
ln(Price) -6.9205*** -0.0173
(1.9002) (0.1985)
Decongestion 0.4486*** 0.0752 -0.5585*** 4.8955 -0.7031
(0.0903) (0.0706) (0.1933) (4.0174) (0.4403)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0005***
(0.0001)










% Liquidable Assets 1.7292 0.8095***
(1.7471) (0.1826)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"R-squared" 0.7328 0.7281 0.9045 0.972 0.6651
N 577 577 577 577 577    44
Table 7 
Market Share, Default Probability and Prices 
This table reports the estimated relationship between market share, default probability and price. The 
dependent variable is market share, measured as the airline’s proportion of Domestic Operating Passenger 
Revenues in the US market. This equation was estimated in conjunction with the set of equations shown in 
Table 5 using three stages least squares. Price (yield) is instrumented with Oil Fuel Cost, Efficiency, and 
Average Miles per Flight and Default Probability is instrumented with the % Liquidable Assets. 
Decongestion measures the average on-time performance by airport, excluding an airline’s own flights, 
weighted by the airline's lagged share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel cost per gallon after 
hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons 
of fuel utilized. Income and unemployment are quarterly for each state and weighted by the airline’s share 
of passengers in that state, lagged one quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of 
competitors an airline faces across its markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of 
assets a firm can recover in case of liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the 
first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008. Only non bankrupt observations are considered. All 
regressions include firm and time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-
















Firm fixed effects Yes
Time fixed effects Yes
"R-squared" 0.8746
N 577  
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Table 8 
Quality, Price and Endogenous Bankruptcy  
This table reports estimated relationships between quality, price (measured by yield) and financial status 
three-stages least squares. The five dependent variables: quality: mishandled baggage, quality: on time 
performance, price, total enplaned passengers and bankruptcy are in columns 1 to 5. Total enplaned 
passengers, bankruptcy and price are used as right-hand-side variables as well. Decongestion measures the 
average on-time performance by airport, excluding an airline’s own flights, weighted by the airline's lagged 
share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel cost per gallon after hedging contracts are considered. 
Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons of fuel utilized.  Income and 
unemployment are quarterly for each state and weighted by the airline’s share of passengers in that state, 
lagged one quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of competitors an airline faces 
across its markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of assets a firm can recover in case 
of liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008. The default state is financial distress without bankruptcy. The sample only considers firm-
quarters with a default probability higher than 10% or in bankruptcy.  We include firm and time fixed 
effects in all estimations. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-value): *<0.1, **<0.05, 
***<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quality: Inv. o Quality: Total
Mishandled On time Enplaned
Variables Baggage Performance ln(Price) Passengers Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy 0.0819*** 0.0370** -0.0936* 1.0179*
(0.0156) (0.0180) (0.0492) (0.5334)
Total Enplaned  0.0135 -0.0449*** 0.0497 -0.0528
Passengers (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0465) (0.0862)
ln(Price) 2.0911 -0.4281
(1.7583) (0.4567)
Decongestion 0.7451*** 0.2921 -1.3564*** 12.1019** -6.3854***
(0.1793) (0.2024) (0.5031) (5.3737) (1.2091)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0003**
(0.0001)










% Liquidable Assets 2.0380***
(0.3219)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"R-squared" 0.8275 0.4307 0.9246 0.9686 0.7212    46
Table 9 
Endogenous Bankruptcy with Additional Instruments 
This table reports estimated relationships between quality, price (measured by yield) and financial status using three-
stages least squares. The five dependent variables: quality: mishandled baggage, quality: on time performance, price, 
total enplaned passengers and bankruptcy are in columns 1 to 5.   In this table, we substitute out for quantity (total 
enplaned passengers) in the bankruptcy equation in column 5 and thus "borrow" the additional instruments - local 
income and unemployment and competition - from our quantity demanded equation.  We also substitute out for 
bankruptcy in the quantity regression presented in column 4.  Total enplaned passengers, default probability and price 
are used as right-hand-side variables as well. Decongestion measures the average on-time performance by airport, 
excluding an airline’s own flights, weighted by the airline's lagged share of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel 
cost per gallon after hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by 
gallons of fuel utilized.  Income and unemployment are quarterly for each state and weighted by the airline’s share of 
passengers in that state, lagged one quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of competitors an 
airline faces across its markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of assets a firm can recover in 
case of liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008. Only non bankrupt observations are considered. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quality: Inv. of Quality: Total
Mishandled On time Enplaned
Variables Baggage Performance ln(Price) Passengers Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy 0.0787*** 0.0350** -0.1031**
(0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0519)
Total Enplaned  0.0132 -0.0432*** 0.0538
Passengers (0.0097) (0.0102) (0.0511)
ln(Price) 1.6997 -0.3288
(1.7063) (0.5165)
Decongestion 0.7298*** 0.2732 -1.3845*** 5.3416 -6.4558***
(0.1771) (0.1980) (0.5251) (4.5393) (1.1747)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0004***
(0.0002)










% Liquidable Assets 1.5714 1.5593***
(1.1260) (0.3052)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
"R-squared" 0.8316 0.4621 0.9182 0.9734 0.7156  47 
 
Table 10 
Route Level Analysis 
This table reports estimated relationships between on-time performance and financial status using two-stages least squares. Observations are at the firm-route level. Panel A presents 
the results for financial distress and Panel B for bankruptcy. Columns 1 to 4 use as dependent variable our previous measure of on-time performance: 1/Late, where Late is the 
percentage of late flights a route has on a quarter times the average lateness of the late flights. Columns 5 and 6 use as dependent variable the logarithm of total late flights per 
quarter.. The main independent variable of Panel A is Merton’s naïve default probability as constructed by Bharath and Shumway (2008). The main independent variable of Panel B 
is the bankruptcy dummy. Columns 1 to 6 use total enplaned passengers (TEP) at the route level as an additional explanatory variable. TEP is measured in millions of passengers. 
Columns 5 and 6 also use the logarithm of total enplaned flights as control variable.   Financial conditions and TEP are instrumented by the percentage of liquidable assets, oil 
prices, efficiency, competition, income and unemployment.    
 
Panel A:   Financial distress at the route level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables On_time On_time On_time On_time Log(Late Flights) Log(Late Flights)
Default Probability -0.0433*** -0.0433 -0.0424*** -0.0424 0.0357*** 0.0357
(0.0110) (0.0745) (0.0127) (0.0792) (0.0058) (0.0846)
TEP 5.986*** 5.986*** 5.339*** 5.339*** -1.0739*** -1.0739
(0.2131) (1.4601) (0.1701) (1.0574) (0.1129) (0.7936)
Log(Total Flights) 1.013*** 1.013***
(0.0024) (0.0107)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No
Firm-Route Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Cluster No Yes No Yes No Yes
Route Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0239 0.0239 0.1333 0.1333 0.5282 0.5282
N 202,233 201,741 202,233 202,233 202,233 201,741  
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Panel B:   Bankruptcy at the route level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables On_time On_time On_time On_time Log(Late Flights) Log(Late Flights)
Bankruptcy 0.0360*** 0.0360* 0.0253*** 0.0253** -0.0158*** -0.0158
(0.0056) (0.0198) (0.0059) (0.0121) (0.0048) (0.0243)
TEP 3.146*** 3.146 3.956*** 3.956** 0.3912 0.3912
(0.3159) (2.6392) (0.2646) (1.7995) (0.2741) (1.1444)
Log(Total Flights) 1.006*** 1.006***
(0.0042) (0.0150)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No
Firm-Route Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Cluster No Yes No Yes No Yes
Route Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instruments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.0660 0.0660 0.1966 0.1966 0.6511 0.6511





Simultaneous Estimation of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
We analyze the eﬀects of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy simultaneously on ﬁrm supply deci-
sions at the ﬁrm level. This analysis has eﬃciency gains, relative to the separate analyses, but it
also has two drawbacks. First, we have to impose a value of zero on the default probability when
it is not deﬁned. Second, we are no longer able to identify the demand equation since we need
to borrow instruments from the demand to identify the separate eﬀects of default probability and
bankruptcy.
The probability of default is not deﬁned when the ﬁrm is in bankruptcy. Therefore, we set it
equal to zero for bankrupt observations. Note we are not explicitly asserting that the ﬁrm is not
distressed when in bankruptcy, but rather we let the bankruptcy indicator variable probability pick
up the full eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress when the ﬁrm is actually in bankruptcy. Ideally, we would
use a dummy variable that takes value of 1 when the default probability has a missing value and
zero otherwise, rather than just imposing a zero. However, this variable will be perfectly collinear
with bankruptcy because when a ﬁrm is in bankruptcy its default probability is not deﬁned. The
cost of imposing a zero on the default probability when it is undeﬁned -during bankruptcy- will be
explained when we present the results.
The system of equations we would like to estimate is the following:
1b. S=h(Q,P r _ d e f ,B a n k r u p t ,Y )
2b. P=g(Q,P r _ d e f ,B a n k r u p t ,X )
3b. Q=f(Pr_def,B a n k r u p t ,P ,S ,W )
4b. Pr_def=j(Q,P ,S ,Z )
5b. Bankrupt=k(Q,P ,S ,Z )
However, as we only have one instrument in Z, the percentage of liquidable assets, to instrument both
ﬁnancial conditions we have to use instruments from other equations to instrument bankruptcy and
default probability. We replace equation (1b) in equations (3b) to (5b) as in the previous analysis,
but now we also replace equations (2b) and (3b) into equations (4b) and (5b), equations (4b) and
(5b) into equation (3b) and equation (2b) into equation (3b), obtaining the following system:
A-11b’. S=h(Q,P r _ d e f ,B a n k r u p t ,Y )
2b’. P=g(Q,P r _ d e f ,B a n k r u p t ,X )
The following three equations for quantity and two ﬁnancial condition are estimated in terms of
exogenous instruments.
3b’. Q=f(Y,X ,W ,Z )
4b’. Pr_def=j(Y,X ,W ,Z )
5b’. Bankrupt=k(Y,X ,W ,Z )
We have 4 instruments to instrument Q, Pr_def and Bankrupt in the price equation: the percentage
of liquidable assets, competition, income and unemployment and we have seven instruments, these
same four instruments plus the oil fuel cost, average ﬂights per mile and oil eﬃciency, to instrument
Q, Pr_def and Bankrupt in the quality equation. The cost of this approach is that now we do not
estimate the demand and ﬁnancial condition equations, but only how exogenous variables aﬀect
them in equilibrium. This is not an important issue as the estimation of demand and ﬁnancial
condition is not our main goal.
In A1, we present ﬁr s ts t a g er e g r e s s i o n sf o rt h et h r e ee n d o g e n o u sv a r i a b l e st h a tw eu s ea se x p l i c a -
tive variables in the supply equations: Total enplaned passengers (quantity), default probability and
bankruptcy. The estimated equations correspond to equations (3b’), (4b’) and (5b’). Note that in
Table A2 below we use the ﬁtted values of these equations, replacing the predicted default prob-
ability with a zero when the ﬁrms are bankrupt, to estimate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial distress and
bankruptcy on quality and price.
Table A1 goes here
The results in the ﬁrst column of Table A1 are sensible, showing that quantity increases with
income and decreases with unemployment and competition. In column 2, we see that the default
probability increases with the percentage of liquidable assets and decreases with income. What
may look surprising is that default probability decreases with fuel cost; however, this is due to the
subsequent, simultaneous eﬀect that feeds through prices, as prices increase with a ﬁrm’s fuel cost.
Lastly, we see similar eﬀects in column 3 for bankruptcy.
A-2Table A2 presents our second stage regressions for quality and price. These equations correspond
to equations (1b’) for both measures of quality and (2b’) for prices. To incorporate the potential
error correlation structure we estimate the three equations simultaneously using seemingly unrelated
equations (SURE). To get consistent standard errors we use 50 bootstrap repetitions given that the
ﬁrst and second stage were estimated separately.
Table A2 goes here
T h er e s u l t si nT a b l eA 2s h o wt h a tﬁnancial distress, as reﬂe c t e di na ni n c r e a s ei nt h eﬁrm’s
default probability, decreases the provision of quality. This result reinforces the previous result in
Table 5. The estimated coeﬃcient on bankruptcy now has to be interpreted relative to a healthy
ﬁrm. We see ﬁrms in bankruptcy increase the quality of their baggage handling and on time
performance, but this eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant for baggage handling. The equality
of the coeﬃcients of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy is rejected using a t-test at the 5% level
of signiﬁcance. Thus, the results of this estimation method are in agreement with our previous
ﬁndings: quality decreases with ﬁnancial distress and increases in bankruptcy relative to ﬁnancial
distress. In addition, we ﬁnd that quality of baggage handling is higher in bankruptcy than in the
pre-distress period, which was also the case in our previous set of results. We cannot asses that
on-time performance is higher in bankruptcy than in the pre-distress situation, but at least we can
assure it is not lower. This is also consistent with our previous results where the increase in on-time
performance quality in bankruptcy relative to the pre-distress situation was modest.
Imposing a zero value for the predicted default probability when the ﬁrm is bankrupt is innocuous
if we expect a change in supply behavior before and after bankruptcy. But, if the supply behavior
of a bankrupt ﬁrm follows the same trend it showed during ﬁnancial distress this procedure is
somewhat problematic, as in the case of prices. The predicted default probability and the predicted
bankruptcy are highly collinear when there is no value imposition. So, if we expect prices to go
down in bankruptcy relative to a distress situation, by setting the default probability equal to zero
this method assigns the price reduction to bankruptcy even if it is due to ﬁnancial distress. Now
bankruptcy is the variable that matches best the inverse behavior of prices as predicted bankruptcy
stays high in bankruptcy while prices stay low. Default probability, on the other hand does not
stay high while in bankruptcy: it is set equal to zero. This explains why in Table A2 we observe




First Stage Regressions for TEP, Default Probability and Bankruptcy  
This table reports the first stage regressions of Total Enplaned Passengers (TEP), Default Probability and 
Bankruptcy on all the exogenous variables available. Decongestion measures the average on-time 
performance by airport, excluding an airline’s own flights, weighted by the airline's lagged share of 
customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel cost per gallon after hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency 
is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons of fuel utilized.  Income and unemployment 
are quarterly for each state and weighted by the airline’s share of passengers in that state, lagged one 
quarter. Competition represents the weighted average number of competitors an airline faces across its 
markets.  % Liquidable Assets is the fraction of the total value of assets a firm can recover in case of 
liquidation, following Berger et al (1996). Data are quarterly from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth 
quarter of 2008. We include firm and time fixed effects in all estimations. Standard errors are in 






Variables Passengers Probability Bankruptcy
Decongestion 4.1140 -0.7845 -2.3065***
(3.4055) (0.4796) (0.5061)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0035** -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln(Oil Fuel Cost) -3.9059*** -0.1821** -0.0455
(0.6288) (0.0774) (0.0934)
ln(Efficiency) 1.8311** -0.0731 0.0492
(0.8777) (0.1124) (0.1304)
Competition -1.9412*** 0.0589 0.0530
(0.2635) (0.0365) (0.0392)
ln(Income) 24.6908*** -2.0843** -2.4048**
(7.7126) (1.0325) (1.1463)
Unemployment -62.7373** -5.1595 2.8508
(31.9349) (4.2027) (4.7463)
% Liquidable Assets 0.8212 1.0972*** 1.5883***
(1.3155) (0.1914) (0.1955)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
R-squared within 0.3273 0.573 0.268









   A-5
Table A2 
Second Stage on Quality and Prices  
This table estimates a SURE using inverse of mishandled baggage, on-time performance and price (yield) 
as dependent variables. The variables Total Enplaned Passengers, default probability and bankruptcy are 
instrumented values obtained from Table VIII. These equations correspond to equations (1b’) and (2b’) 
from the text. Decongestion is average on-time performance by airport excluding an airline’s own flights, 
weighted by the airline's lagged number of customers. Oil Fuel Cost is the actual fuel cost per gallon after 
hedging contracts are considered. Efficiency is defined as ASM (available seats miles) divided by gallons 
of fuel utilized. Data are quarterly from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter of 2008. We include 
firm and time fixed effects in all estimations. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level (p-
value): *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.01. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Quality: Inv. of Quality:
Mishandled On time
Variables Baggage Performance ln(Price)
Default Probability -0.0507*** -0.0341* 0.0132
(0.0190) (0.0198) (0.0309)
Bankruptcy 0.0453*** 0.0014 -0.1690***
(0.0168) (0.0141) (0.0459)
Total Enplaned  0.0030** -0.0015 0.0082*
Passengers (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0050)
Decongestion 0.4903*** 0.0508 -0.5874***
(0.1072) (0.1679) (0.1619)
Average Miles per Flight -0.0005***
(0.0001)




Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
"R-squared" 0.8401 0.7707 0.9516
N 647 647 647  